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I.  INTRODUCTION 
When Abraham took his knife and prepared to slay Isaac, Abraham 
was responding to God’s order to do so.1  To pass the supreme test of 
faith, Abraham was required to unconditionally surrender to God’s 
directive that he sacrifice his only son.2 
 
 
 1. The story of the binding of Isaac, known as the Akedah, is told in Genesis 
22:1–18.  For a retelling of the story in a twentieth century context, see Norval Morris, 
Ake Dah, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 553 (1985).  In Morris’s story, however, both the colonial 
police officer who narrates the story and the examining psychiatrist believe that the 
father’s attempted murder of his son resulted from the accused’s mental illness.  Id. at 
587.  If tried, the accused would be found not guilty by reason of insanity.  Id. at 583. 
The colonial police officer in Morris’s story is named Blair and he serves in the 
Moulmein District of colonial Burma.  Our colleague, Maimon Schwarzschild, informs 
us that British author George Orwell’s real name was Eric Arthur Blair, and that, as a 
young man, he actually served in the Moulmein District of colonial Burma as an 
assistant district superintendent in the Indian Imperial Police.  8 THE NEW 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 1019–20 (15th ed. 1998).  Morris never openly identifies 
his narrator as Orwell. 
 2. Isaac was not killed, and the order to sacrifice him was given only to test the 
strength of Abraham’s belief in God.  Human sacrifice is antithetical to Jewish belief.  In 
the book of Deuteronomy, the ancient Israelites were instructed not to act as did the 
Canaanites, “for every abomination to the LORD, which He hateth, have they done unto 
their gods; for even their sons and their daughters do they burn in the fire to their gods.”  
Deuteronomy 12:31; see also Deuteronomy 18:10 (instructing: “There shall not be found 
among you any one that maketh his son or his daughter to pass through the fire”). 
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Sigmund Freud, however, would have interpreted the Biblical story 
differently.  There was no command to sacrifice Isaac, he would have 
asserted, because there was no God to issue the command.  As a 
scientist,3 Freud believed that “there is no other source of knowledge of 
the universe, but the intellectual manipulation of carefully verified 
observations, in fact, what is called research, and that no knowledge can 
be obtained from revelation, intuition or inspiration.”4  Thus, to Freud, 
religion was illusion5—the unjustified fulfillment of emotional wishes 
not grounded on scientific research or knowledge.6  Freud characterized 
religion as 
the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity; like the obsessional neurosis of 
children, it arose out of the Oedipus complex, out of the relation to the 
father. . . .  If, on the one hand, religion brings with it obsessional restrictions, 
exactly as an individual obsessional neurosis does, on the other hand it 
comprises a system of wishful illusions together with a disavowal of reality, 
such as we find in an isolated form nowhere else but in amentia, in a state of 
blissful hallucinatory confusion.7 
But Freud was not present to challenge Abraham’s decision to bind 
Isaac for sacrifice or to question whether Abraham was responding to 
 
 3. According to Freud, psychoanalysis contributed to science by extending 
research to the human mind.  SIGMUND FREUD, A Philosophy of Life, Lecture XXXV, in 
NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 217–18 (W.J.H. Sprott trans., 
1933). 
 4. Id. at 217. 
 5. Id. at 239.  Karl Marx also agreed that religion is an illusion, a product of the 
human imagination.  Religion is “the sigh of the distressed creature, the soul of a 
heartless world, as it is also the spirit of a spiritless condition.  It is the opium of the 
people.”  KARL MARX, ON RELIGION xx (Saul K. Padover ed. & trans., 1974).  Despite 
their agreement on this issue, Freud questioned whether Marxism, at least as embodied 
by Russian Bolshevism, was a true social science.  Freud noted that the Communists had 
established a ban upon thought, which is as inexorable as was formerly that of 
religion.  All critical examination of the Marxist theory is forbidden; doubts of 
its validity are as vindictively punished as heresy once was by the Catholic 
Church.  The works of Marx, as the source of revelation, have taken the place 
of the Bible and the Koran, although they are no freer from contradictions and 
obscurities than these earlier holy books. 
FREUD, supra note 3, at 245–46. 
 6. FREUD, supra note 3, at 218.  Freud asserted: “Religion is an attempt to get 
control over the sensory world, in which we are placed, by means of the wish-world, 
which we have developed inside us as a result of biological and psychological 
necessities.  But it cannot achieve its end.”  Id. at 229. 
 7. SIGMUND FREUD, THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION 43 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 
W.W. Norton & Co. 1961) (1927).  Freud also cautioned that if religious belief is 
equated with knowledge, it “would open the door which gives access to the region of the 
psychoses, whether individual or group psychoses.”  FREUD, supra note 3, at 218. 
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illusion or hallucinatory confusion rather than a command from the 
Almighty.  And even if the father of psychiatry had been there, he is not 
likely to have persuaded the father of monotheism to resist—or even to 
question—what Abraham perceived as a deific decree. 
Unfortunately, Abraham’s crucible was not the last.  Human sacrifice 
at the direction of God, or what is perceived—rightly or wrongly—to be 
God, has occurred throughout history.8  Often religious believers 
sacrificed an individual to appease an omnipotent god so that the whole 
community would not suffer from some catastrophe, such as disease or 
loss of fertility.9  The life of the victim was not minimized by the act of 
sacrifice; its importance was elevated by its ability to placate the all-
powerful deity and avoid calamity to the group.10 
Human sacrifice, however, is not limited to organized religions that 
prevail in a given society.  Individuals, relying upon their own religious 
beliefs, sometimes kill.  Within the last few years San Diego experienced at 
least two such examples.  On November 14, 1998, twenty-year-old 
Brandon Wilson slashed nine-year-old Matthew Cecchi’s throat in a 
beach-side restroom.  At trial, Wilson admitted the random killing, 
characterizing the act as a sacrifice to fulfill God’s wishes.  He claimed 
that God had ordained him a killer to help exterminate humanity.11  
 
 8. See generally LARRY S. MILNER, HARDNESS OF HEART/HARDNESS OF LIFE: THE 
STAIN OF HUMAN INFANTICIDE 319–60 (2000) (discussing human sacrifice in various 
civilizations). 
The Thugs, for example, were a religious organization that existed for several hundred 
years in India.  As worshipers of Kali, the Hindu goddess of destruction, Thugs robbed 
and murdered their victims.  In the nineteenth century, the British engaged in a concerted 
effort to eliminate the Thugs, capturing 3266 during the period of 1831 to 1837.  Of this 
number, 412 were hanged, and many were imprisoned for life or transported.  Thereafter, 
the religion became extinct.  11 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 741–42 (15th ed. 
1998).  The British reading public was introduced to the Thug religious practices through 
a novel published in 1839.  The story is narrated by a captive leader of a band of Thugs 
who tells the story of his life in great detail.  PHILIP M. TAYLOR, CONFESSIONS OF A THUG 
(Oxford Univ. Press 1986) (1839). 
 9. MILNER, supra note 8, at 320.  The Aztecs, for example, are estimated to have 
sacrificed between 20,000 and 250,000 individuals in religious rituals to pacify their sun 
god, Huitzilopochtli.  Id. at 326. 
 10. Id. at 321. 
 11. Alex Roth, 9-Year-Old’s Killer Receives Death Penalty, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Nov. 5, 1999, at B-1.  Wilson informed a probation officer that he was not afraid 
to die by lethal injection but “would prefer to be burned at the stake, something like a 
Christian martyr.”  Id.  At his trial, Wilson testified that by killing people, he was helping 
their souls experience a rebirth in heaven.  He also testified that God wanted him to 
recruit others and to teach them how to be killers.  Alex Roth, Jury Rules Child Killer 
Sane, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 29, 1999, at A-1.  At the penalty phase, Wilson 
testified that he had “no remorse whatsoever” for killing Matthew and would gladly do it 
again.  He asked the jury to give him the death penalty.  The jury did so.  Alex Roth, 
Defender of Killers Like Wilson Has Had Enough, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 31, 
1999, at B-1. 
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Perhaps even more terrifying was the decision of David and Jennifer 
Mayer not to provide food to their two-year-old son, Zechariah, because 
they believed that God did not like fat babies.  The child starved to 
death.12  Although the parents did not consciously decide to kill their 
child, their religious beliefs led to their conduct that produced the 
death.13 
This Article explores how, in assessing the motivation of those who 
kill because they believe they were directed by God to do so, society 
distinguishes religious-based decisions from delusional decisions that 
result from mental disorder.  Part II discusses how religion is defined in 
our society, and Part III considers the extent to which religious conduct, 
as opposed to religious belief, is protected from governmental intrusion. 
Part IV discusses the insanity defense used to exculpate from criminal 
responsibility persons who suffer from a serious mental disorder 
affecting their ability to distinguish right from wrong at the time they act.  
A “deific decree” commanding the defendant to kill has been characterized, 
not as a religious belief, but as a delusional belief justifying an insanity 
verdict.  But if a “religiousity” defense is not available to exculpate the 
hyperreligious from criminal liability for acts they believe are morally 
right, should the mentally disordered be exculpated for their religiously 
motivated, though illegal, acts?  If so, is society able to identify those 
who belong in the protected group?  If a mentally disordered person 
claims that God ordered him or her to kill, are psychiatrists competent to 
assess whether the defendant acted from a delusional belief, or whether 
he or she acted from a religious conviction?  In our society in which all 
sincerely held religious beliefs are entitled to equal treatment, can we 
appropriately declare a defendant’s claimed religious belief to be a false 
belief, the product of a mentally disordered mind? 
To answer these questions, Part V examines the meaning of delusion, 
especially as that concept is explained in the psychiatric profession’s 
standard diagnostic manual.14  Psychiatry specifically excludes religious 
 
 12. Greg Moran, Father Gets 25 Years to Life in Son’s Death, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Jan. 14, 2000, at B-1; see also Greg Moran, Father to Be Sentenced Tomorrow for 
1st-Degree Murder, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 12, 2000, at A-1. 
 13. At trial, two mental health experts testified that the father “suffers from a 
psychotic disorder and has ‘elaborate and bizarre’ delusions about religion and God.”  
Moran, Father Gets 25 Years to Life in Son’s Death, supra note 12, at B-1.  The 
defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to prison for twenty-five 
years to life.  Id. 
 14. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
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beliefs from the definition of delusion because a religious belief cannot 
be declared to be a false belief.  Because a person’s sincerely held belief 
that God ordered him or her to kill qualifies as a religious belief, it 
should not be characterized as a delusion.  Thus, the insanity defense 
should not be available to those who kill at God’s command. 
II.  DEFINING RELIGION 
A.  Religion in the United States: Historical Development 
The Pilgrims in 1620,15 the Puritans in 1630,16 and other early settlers 
came to America to escape religious persecution.  No wonder then that 
religious liberty was embraced by our founding fathers.  Jefferson 
identified it as “the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights.”17  
Madison declared: “The Religion then of every man must be left to the 
conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man 
to exercise it as these may dictate.”18  Through the Establishment Clause 
and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, our religious 
liberty was secured as the very first freedom mentioned in the Bill of 
Rights.19 
Of course, the ideal of religious liberty was not extended to the Native 
Americans who lived in our country when the Pilgrims landed or to the 
African Americans who were imported as slaves.  Their pagan beliefs 
 
MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-IV) (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. 
 15. In 1620, the Pilgrims established the first permanent settlement, Plymouth 
Colony, in New England.  Some of the Pilgrims were members of the English Separatist 
Church who fled from England to Leyden, the Netherlands, in 1609 to practice their 
religion without official interference.  9 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 441 
(15th ed. 1998).  They migrated to America because of economic hardship and because 
of a desire to establish an identity free of Dutch influence.  29 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
BRITANNICA 274 (15th ed. 1998). 
 16. The Puritans, who came to Massachusetts in 1630, were persecuted in England 
because of their religious beliefs.  They sought ecclesiastical reform, but only within the 
church structure. The Puritans, however, did not practice religious tolerance.  29 THE 
NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 15, at 274.  Individuals “with differing 
religious views were banished, including Roger Williams from Salem and Anne 
Hutchinson from Boston.  Unrepentent Quakers and Anabaptists were banished, and a 
few were executed.”  Id. 
 17. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Freedom of Religion at the University of Virginia (Oct. 7, 
1822), in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 957, 958 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1943). 
 18. JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments 
(June 20, 1785), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295, 299 (Robert A. Rutland et al. 
eds., 1973).  Madison added: “This right is in its nature an unalienable right.  It is 
unalienable, because the opinions of men, depending only on the evidence contemplated 
by their own minds cannot follow the dictates of other men.”  Id. 
 19. The First Amendment begins: “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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were not deemed worthy of protection.20  Religious liberty was grounded 
in Christian, especially Protestant, theology.21  The primacy of 
Christianity22 was acknowledged, not just during our country’s founding 
period, but also by the Supreme Court in 1892, declaring us to be “a 
Christian nation,”23 and again in 1931, declaring us to be “a Christian 
people.”24 
We were a religious country when our country was founded; we 
continue to be a religious country today.  A recent Newsweek poll 
revealed that eighty-four percent of adult Americans believe that God 
performs miracles and forty-eight percent report that they personally 
have experienced or witnessed a miracle.25  In the 2000 presidential 
election campaign, Democratic candidate and former Vice President Al 
Gore professed to be a born-again Christian who, when faced with 
difficult decisions, asks himself, “What would Jesus do?”26  Republican 
candidate and now President George W. Bush said that Jesus is his 
favorite political philosopher “because he changed my heart.”27  Joseph 
Lieberman, the first Jewish vice-presidential candidate of a major 
political party, proposed a greater role for religion in American public 
life, declaring: “As a people we need to reaffirm our faith and renew the 
dedication of our nation and ourselves to God and God’s purpose.”28 
We have become a more religiously diverse society.  Diversity has 
resulted from immigration of non-European, non-Christian peoples, such 
as the Chinese in the mid-1800s and the Indo-Chinese following the 
 
 20. See JOHN WITTE JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
EXPERIMENT 37 (2000).  On September 8, 2000, Kevin Gover, Assistant Secretary-Indian 
Affairs, Department of the Interior, acknowledged that the Bureau of Indian Affairs had, 
over its 175-year history, engaged in “destructive efforts to annihilate Indian cultures,” 
including the prohibition of Indian religious practices.  Kevin Gover, Remarks at the 
Ceremony Acknowledging the 175th Anniversary of the Establishment of the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (Sept. 8, 2000), at http://www.doi.gov/bia/as-ia/175gover.htm (last visited 
Oct. 27, 2001); see also Matt Kelley, Bureau Regrets Treatment of Indians, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB., Sept. 9, 2000, at A-7. 
 21. Daniel O. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the Original 
Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 4 (2000). 
 22. See generally id. at 4–5 (discussing the primacy of Christianity in the United 
States). 
 23. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892). 
 24. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 625 (1931). 
 25. What Miracles Mean, NEWSWEEK, May 1, 2000, at 55–56. 
 26. Richard Pérez-Peña, Lieberman Seeks Greater Role for Religion in Public Life, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2000, at A14. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
MORRIS.DOC 2/12/2020  10:35 AM 
 
980 
Vietnam War, and from religious experimentation of a free citizenry.  
By the 1960s, according to the Supreme Court, over 250 religious sects 
existed in the United States, providing a “richness and variety of 
spiritual life in our country.”29  During that decade, the Supreme Court 
renounced Christian primacy, adopting instead a policy of denominational 
equality—the requirement of equal treatment between and among 
religions.30  By banning the reading of officially sanctioned prayers31 
and the Bible32 in public schools, and by invalidating a law prohibiting 
the teaching of evolution in public schools,33 the Court assured that all 
religions were entitled to equivalent, though exalted, status.34 
B.  Religion and the Supreme Court 
Given the importance of religion to Americans, and given the 
increasing divergence of religious expression in American society, one 
would anticipate that the Supreme Court would have carefully defined 
religion as a concept.  Such an expectation, however, has been largely 
unfulfilled.  Despite the numerous definitions and definitional approaches 
 
 29. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 174 (1965).  Justice Clark, writing for 
the Court in Seeger, noted: 
Some [religions] believe in a purely personal God, some in a supernatural 
deity; others think of religion as a way of life envisioning as its ultimate goal 
the day when all men can live together in perfect understanding and peace. 
There are those who think of God as the depth of our being; others, such as the 
Buddhists, strive for a state of lasting rest through self-denial and inner 
purification; in Hindu philosophy, the Supreme Being is the transcendental 
reality which is truth, knowledge and bliss. 
Id. at 174–75. 
 30. See Conkle, supra note 21, at 6–8 (discussing Supreme Court cases supplanting 
Christian dominance with denominational equality).  Conkle noted, however, that the 
shift to religious equality was foreshadowed by earlier decisions.  Id. at 6 (citing Everson 
v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)), in which the Court declared that “Neither [the 
federal government nor a state] can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or 
prefer one religion over another.”). 
 31. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).  The offending Regents’ prayer, 
recited aloud in the presence of a teacher at the start of each day, reads as follows: 
“Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings 
upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country.”  Id. at 422. 
 32. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963). 
 33. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1968). 
 34. In School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 226, Justice Clark, writing for the 
Court’s majority, noted: 
     The place of religion in our society is an exalted one, achieved through a 
long tradition of reliance on the home, the church and the inviolable citadel of 
the individual heart and mind. We have come to recognize through bitter 
experience that it is not within the power of government to invade that citadel, 
whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, to advance or retard.  In the 
relationship between man and religion, the State is firmly committed to a 
position of neutrality. 
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proposed by various academics35 and developed in lower court 
opinions,36 the Supreme Court has avoided an explicit constitutional 
 
 35. See, e.g., CATHERINE L. ALBANESE, AMERICA: RELIGIONS AND RELIGION 11 (3d 
ed. 1999) (defining religion as “a system of symbols (creed, code, cultus) by means of 
which people (a community) orient themselves in the world with reference to both 
ordinary and extraordinary powers, meanings, and values”); Jesse H. Choper, Defining 
“Religion” in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 597–604 (proposing a 
content-based definition requiring the belief in extratemporal consequences, i.e., 
“whether the effects of actions taken pursuant or contrary to the dictates of a person’s 
beliefs extend in some meaningful way beyond his lifetime,” id. at 599); George C. 
Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of “Religion,” 71 
GEO. L.J. 1519, 1534–48, 1553, 1564–65 (1983) (critiquing content-based, i.e., functional, 
definitions of religion and proposing instead that features common to traditional Eastern 
and Western religions be identified so that a paradigm of a religious belief system can be 
developed, and applied to determine, in individual cases, whether a belief system is or is 
not a religion); Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. 
L. REV. 753, 762, 767–78 (1984) (proposing an analogical approach, similar to that 
proposed by George Freeman, as a method of determining whether a claimed religion is 
indeed one); Timothy L. Hall, Note, The Sacred and the Profane: A First Amendment 
Definition of Religion, 61 TEX. L. REV. 139, 173 (1982) (characterizing “religion as a 
way of perceiving reality . . . in terms of sacred and profane categories”); Note, Toward 
a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1056 (1978) (proposing 
that “religion be given an expansive functional definition, embracing whatever is for the 
individual an ‘ultimate concern’”). 
 36. For example, in Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 207 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., 
concurring), Judge Arlin Adams utilized an analogical approach to defining religion, 
comparing whether the claimed religion confronts the same concerns, or serves the same 
purposes, as traditional religions.  Judge Adams identified three useful indicia of 
traditional religions that help determine whether the beliefs in question qualify as a 
religion.  Id. at 207–08.  First, religions address fundamental questions of ultimate 
concern.  Id. at 208.  Second, religions are comprehensive belief systems, claiming an 
ultimate truth.  Id. at 209.  Third, religions have rituals and structure, such as services, 
ceremonies, clergy, and other formal, external or surface signs.  Id. at 209–10.  Judge 
Adams applied his analogical approach when he wrote the majority opinion in Africa v. 
Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981).   
In Jacques v. Hilton, 569 F. Supp. 730, 732–36 (D.N.J. 1983), the court used Judge 
Adams’ analogical approach to determine that the United Church of Saint Dennis, a 
prison-based organization, was not a religion.  The analogical approach was also used to 
determine whether another prison-based organization, the Church of the New Song, was 
a religion.  Compare Theriault v. Silber, 453 F. Supp. 254, 257–58, 265 (W.D. Tex. 
1978) (holding that a belief system was not a religion) with Remmers v. Brewer, 361 F. 
Supp. 537, 541–42 (S.D. Iowa 1973) (holding that a belief system was a religion), aff’d, 
494 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1974).   
Scientology was determined to be a religion, in part, because “[i]ts fundamental 
writings contain a general account of man and his nature comparable in scope, if not in 
content, to those of some recognized religions.”  Founding Church of Scientology v. 
United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1969).  One court focused on whether the 
belief system embraced an ultimate, nonintellectual concern.  See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna 
Consciousness v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 440–43 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that Krishna 
Consciousness is a religion entitled to solicit contributions).  Another court considered 
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definition of religion.37  Over the years, however, various cases have 
forced the Court to distinguish religions from nonreligions.  From a 
narrow definition initially, a broad definition of religion has ultimately 
evolved. 
In 1890, the Court defined religion traditionally, requiring a belief in a 
deity.  “[R]eligion,” wrote Justice Field in Davis v. Beason,38 “has reference 
to one’s views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they 
impose of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his 
will.”39  This requirement of theism was construed narrowly to mean a 
belief in, and worship of, God as practiced in conventional, well-
established Christian religions.  For example, in a case decided later that 
year, the Court characterized the Mormon belief in polygamy as a false 
belief—“a sophistical plea”40—and as a “return to barbarism.”41  It is not 
a religious belief, wrote the Court, because “[i]t is contrary to the spirit 
of Christianity and of the civilization which Christianity has produced in 
the Western world.”42 
Such a parochial definition of religion would not endure.  Religions 
could not be restricted to those that conformed to “the spirit of 
Christianity” or even to the belief in a god or gods.43  In 1961, in 
Torcaso v. Watkins, the Court held that a state constitutional provision 
requiring an applicant for public office to declare a belief in God 
unconstitutionally infringed upon his freedom of belief and religion and 
could not, therefore, be enforced against him.44  Justice Black, writing 
for the Court, noted that the Constitution prohibits the states and the 
 
whether the belief system encompassed “fundamental questions of the nature of reality 
and relationship of human beings to reality.”  Alabama & Cousshatta Tribes v. Trs. of 
Big Sandy Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F. Supp. 1319, 1329 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (holding that the 
Native American Indian movement is a religion and upholding the right of male 
members of that religion to wear long hair in public schools). 
 37. Daniel Conkle asserts that the Supreme Court has avoided the issue of 
definition because “at the turn of the millennium, the definition of religion has become 
ever more elusive and problematic.”  Conkle, supra note 21, at 32.  Indeed, George 
Freeman asserts “that the search for the constitutional definition of ‘religion’ is 
misguided.  There simply is no essence of religion, no single feature or set of features 
that all religions have in common and that distinguishes religion from everything else.”  
Freeman, supra note 35, at 1565. 
 38. 133 U.S. 333 (1890), overruled by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 39. Id. at 342.  The Court also distinguished between religions, which are entitled 
to constitutional protection, and cults, which are not.  Id. 
 40. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 49 
(1890). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. But see Andrew W. Austin, Faith and the Constitutional Definition of 
Religion, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 42 (1991) (defining religion as faith in “some greater 
power than man”). 
 44. 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961). 
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federal government from enacting laws that favor all religions to the 
disadvantage of individuals who do not believe in any religion or that 
favor religions based on a belief in God over religions based on different 
beliefs.45  In a footnote, he specifically identified Buddhism, Taoism, 
Ethical Culture, and Secular Humanism as nonexclusive examples of 
nontheistic religions.46 
Within the next ten years, in the context of interpreting a section of the 
Military Selective Service Act,47 the Court decided two cases that confirmed 
and expanded Justice Black’s broad conception of religion.  The statute48 
exempted (and still exempts today) from combatant training and service 
any person “who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously 
opposed to participation in war in any form.”49  “Religious training and 
belief” was further defined as “an individual’s belief in a relation to a 
Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any 
human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, 
or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.”50 
In United States v. Seeger,51 the Court held that a “sincere and meaningful 
belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that 
filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption 
comes within the statutory definition.”52  “[T]he statute,” observed the 
Court, “does not distinguish between externally and internally derived 
beliefs.”53  Thus, Seeger, who expressed skepticism about whether God 
 
 45. Id. at 495.  Previously, in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 
(1947), the Supreme Court held that the Establishment Clause prohibits legislation 
favoring religion over nonreligion, or religious belief over disbelief. 
 46. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495 n.11. 
 47. See 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451–73 (1994).  At the time the first case was decided, 
the statutes were designated as the Universal Military Training and Service Act, Pub. L. 
No. 51, sec. 1, § 451(a), 65 Stat. 75, 75 (1951).  The statutes were redesignated as the 
Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, sec.1, § 451(a), 81 Stat. 100, 
100 (1967). 
 48. 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1994). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 759, sec. 7, § 456(j), 62 Stat. 604, 
613 (1948) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1958)).  In 1967, following 
the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), Congress 
amended the statute to eliminate any reference to a Supreme Being but retained the 
distinction between a religious belief and “political, sociological, or philosophical views, 
or a merely personal moral code.”  Military Selective Service Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 
90-40, sec. 7, § 456(j), 81 Stat. 100, 104 (1967). 
 51. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
 52. Id. at 176. 
 53. Id. at 186.  The Court added that as a practical matter, it would be impossible 
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exists54 but who sincerely believed55 in “goodness and virtue for their 
own sakes,”56 was entitled to claim religious objector status.  Miraculously, 
a statutory requirement that the claimant believe in a Supreme Being 
encompassed those who doubted the existence of a Supreme Being but 
who held “parallel” beliefs that the Court could construe as religious.  
To reach this result, the Court did not rely on its recent decisions 
interpreting the Constitution to require that all religions be treated 
equally,57 but rather, on Congress’s decision to use “Supreme Being” 
instead of “God” in the statute itself.58  The Court noted, however, that 
such a statutory construction avoids imputing an intent on the part of 
Congress to qualify some religious beliefs for conscientious objector 
purposes while excluding others,59 a clearly impermissible classification 
under the Court’s Torcaso60 decision. 
Five years later, Seeger’s “ever-broadening understanding of the modern 
religious community”61 was confirmed.  In Welsh v. United States,62 the 
Court reversed the conviction of a person who refused induction into the 
armed forces as a religious objector.  Even though Welsh “characterized 
his beliefs as having been formed ‘by reading in the fields of history and 
sociology’”63 and “denied that his objection to war was premised on 
religious belief,”64 the Court found that he qualified for conscientious 
objector exemption.  In an opinion written by Justice Black, the four-
judge plurality, applying the Seeger definition of religion, found that 
Welsh’s beliefs were “deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs,”65 
and not merely “political, sociological, or philosophical views or a 
merely personal moral code” that would not qualify under the statute.66 
Justice Harlan concurred in the result.67  Although he joined with the 
Seeger majority in what he now characterized as a “remarkable feat of 
 
to make such a distinction.  Id. 
 54. Id. at 166. 
 55. Id. at 187. 
 56. Id. at 166. 
 57. See supra text accompanying notes 30–34. 
 58. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165. 
 59. Id. at 176.  In concurring, Justice Douglas asserted that if the statute was 
interpreted more narrowly to qualify those of one religious faith while excluding those of 
others, the statute would violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  Id. at 188 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 60. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961); see supra text accompanying 
notes 44–46. 
 61. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 180. 
 62. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
 63. Id. at 341. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 344. 
 66. Id. at 342–43. 
 67. Id. at 344 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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judicial surgery to remove . . . the theistic requirement of [the statute],”68 
he challenged the “lobotomy” performed by the Welsh plurality when it 
interpreted the statutory language to obliterate any distinction between 
religious and nonreligious beliefs.69  Harlan would confront directly the 
issue of the statute’s constitutionality, rather than judicially construing 
the statute in a manner that distorts its intended meaning.70  In his view, 
the statute contravened the Establishment Clause by exempting from 
military service those whose conscientious objection is based on 
religious beliefs—whether theistic or nontheistic—but not those whose 
conscientious objection is based on a secular belief.71 
Although the Court has not directly considered the definition of 
religion in any post-Welsh cases, it has attempted to retain the distinction 
between religious-based and secular-based beliefs.  For example, the 
Court distinguished the decision of the Amish to reject contemporary 
social values for religious reasons from Thoreau’s decision to withdraw 
from society and sequester himself at Waldon Pond for philosophical 
and personal reasons.72  Only religious beliefs are entitled to First 
Amendment protection.73 
III.  REGULATING THE CONDUCT OF RELIGIOUS BELIEVERS 
A.  Introduction 
Falun Gong, developed in 1992, combines traditional slow-motion 
Chinese exercises and meditation with elements of Buddhism and 
Taoism and has attracted millions of adherents.74  On July 22, 1999, the 
Chinese government banned the Falun Gong spiritual movement, declaring 
it an “evil sect.”75  Five years earlier, members of the Aum Shinrikyo 
 
 68. Id. at 351. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 354–56. 
 71. Id. at 356. 
 72. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972).  George Freeman suggested 
that the Court erred in selecting Thoreau as the paradigm of the secular believer.  
Thoreau believed in both a personal and transcendent God.  Freeman, supra note 35, at 
1559–60. 
 73. Id. at 215; see also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981) (“Only 
beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause, which, by its terms, 
gives special protection to the exercise of religion.”). 
 74. 4 Falun Gong Leaders Go On Trial in Beijing, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 
26, 1999, at A-34. 
 75. Elisabeth Rosenthal & Erik Eckholm, Falun Gong Still Going Strong Despite 
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religious sect (Sect of Supreme Truth) released nerve gas into the Tokyo 
subway, killing twelve people and injuring 6000.76  In response, Japanese 
cities used public funds to purchase property owned by the group and 
refused to allow group members to register as residents.77  In March 
2000, at least 235 members of the Movement for the Restoration of the 
Ten Commandments of God committed mass suicide in Kanungu, Uganda.78  
Similar mass suicides occurred in 1997, when thirty-nine members of 
the Heaven’s Gate sect died in Rancho Santa Fe, California, and in 1978, 
when 914 followers of the Reverend Jim Jones died in Jonestown, 
Guyana.  A white supremacist organization in East Peoria, Illinois 
claims religious status today as the World Church of the Creator.79 
For purposes of this Article, it is not necessary to determine whether 
any, or all, of these groups are religions.  When an individual kills, 
claiming that God ordered the death, the relevant questions are whether 
the individual was acting upon a religious belief and whether society 
may intercede to prevent such activity or to punish it if it occurs.  On 
several occasions, the Supreme Court has discussed the meaning of 
religious belief and the extent to which an individual’s religiously 
motivated conduct may, consistent with the Free Exercise Clause, be 
regulated. 
B.  Defining Religious Belief 
Religious beliefs are personal beliefs.  Even back in 1890, when the 
Supreme Court offered its first definition of religion—admittedly, a 
narrow, theistic definition80—it focused on the individual’s “views of his 
relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence 
for his being and character.”81  “The first amendment,” wrote the Court, 
 
Mass Arrests, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 28, 1999, at A-10. 
 76. Calvin Sims, Japan Cities Buy Property to Keep Cult Members Out, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 30, 1999, at A-21. 
 77. Id.  Individuals who are not registered as residents of a city cannot receive 
access to social services.  Id. 
 78. Gavin Pattison, Ugandan Cult Stages Mass Suicide in Which 235 Die by Fire, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 19, 2000, at A-2. 
 79. Racist Group Gained from Deadly Spree, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 3, 
2000, at A-10.  As a guide for its religion, the group uses a book entitled “The White 
Man’s Bible.”  The third of sixteen commandments contained in that book declares that 
“the inferior colored races are our deadly enemies, and the most dangerous of all is the 
Jewish race.  It is our immediate objective to relentlessly expand the white race and keep 
shrinking our enemies.”  Marc Chase, Superior Above All, DAILY EGYPTIAN, Feb. 17, 
1997, at http:www.dailyegyptian.com/spring97/021797/above.html (last visited Nov. 16, 
2001). 
 80. See supra text accompanying notes 38–42. 
 81. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) (emphasis added), overruled by 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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“was intended to allow every one under the jurisdiction of the United 
States to entertain such notions respecting his relations to his Maker and 
the duties they impose as may be approved by his judgment and 
conscience.”82  Seven decades later, the Supreme Court confirmed that 
the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause “is to secure religious liberty in 
the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority.  
Hence it is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive 
effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his 
religion.”83  Although the Court may attempt to distinguish religious 
beliefs from secular beliefs, as it did in its 1972 decision exempting 
Amish children from compulsory secondary education, it errs when it 
attempts to distinguish religious beliefs from personal beliefs.84 
In Thomas v. Review Board,85 the Court elaborated on the personal 
nature of religious belief.  Thomas was a member of the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses who terminated his employment when he was transferred to a 
department that manufactured parts for weapons.  He claimed that his 
religious principles precluded such work.86  The Court held that the 
state’s denial of unemployment benefits to Thomas violated his First 
Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion.87  Without carefully 
analyzing whether Thomas’s refusal to work was motivated by religious 
or nonreligious beliefs, the Court simply accepted Thomas’s statement 
that his decision was made “because of an honest conviction that such 
work was forbidden by his religion.”88  Chief Justice Burger, writing the 
opinion for the Court’s eight-justice majority,89 declared that courts are 
not permitted to determine whether a belief is a religious belief by 
asking whether it is “acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible 
to others.”90  Even if the individual cannot articulate his or her beliefs 
 
 82. Id. (emphasis added). 
 83. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (emphasis added). 
 84. See supra text accompanying notes 72–73 (discussing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1972)); see also Austin, supra note 43, at 16 (asserting that the 
Court’s statement in Yoder was dictum and that the Court erroneously suggested that 
religious beliefs are protected only if the individual belongs to an organized church). 
 85. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
 86. Id. at 709–10. 
 87. Id. at 720. 
 88. Id. at 716. 
 89. Id. at 709.  The eight-justice majority included Justice Blackmun, who joined 
in Parts I, II, and III of the Chief Justice’s opinion, and who concurred, without opinion, 
in the result of Part IV.  Id. at 720. 
 90. Id. at 714. 
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with clarity and precision, and even if the individual admits that he or 
she is “struggling” with his or her beliefs or positions, courts are not 
permitted to dissect them further and to say they are not religious.91  
Additionally, even if other members of the same religion interpret the 
requirements of the religion differently, “the guarantee of free exercise is 
not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a 
religious sect.”92  Courts do not have the competence, and it is not their 
function, warned the Chief Justice, to determine which individual “more 
correctly perceived the commands of their common faith.”93   
In a subsequent case, a unanimous Supreme Court, in an opinion that 
relied upon Thomas, held that the Free Exercise Clause protects individuals 
who are not members of any religious sect, church, or organization but 
who sincerely believe that they are responding to the command of their 
religious beliefs.94  Justice Stewart once asserted that although he might 
never succeed in intelligibly defining what is included within hard-core 
pornography, nevertheless, he knew it when he saw it.95  As for religion, 
however, the Supreme Court forbids such omniscient vision to itself and 
to its disciples.  Government may not desecrate Jewish synagogues as 
houses of false worship or destroy, in an instant, 1000-year-old statutes 
of Buddha as false idols.  In our country, only individuals “know” 
religion, and they know it when they believe it. 
C.  Applying the Religious Belief Requirement to Those         
Commanded by God to Kill 
A person’s sincere belief that God spoke and commanded him or her 
to kill another human being clearly qualifies as a religious belief.  A 
belief that God spoke requires that the person believe in a deity, 
satisfying even the most conservative conception of religion announced 
by the Supreme Court in 1890.96  It certainly could not be characterized 
 
 91. Id. at 715.   
 92. Id. at 715–16. 
 93. Id. at 716.  The Chief Justice added: “Courts are not arbiters of scriptural 
interpretation.”  Id.  Eight years later, the Court, relying upon Thomas, cautioned: “It is 
not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a 
faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.”  Hernandez v. 
Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). 
 94. Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989).  Frazee, 
who was denied unemployment benefits after refusing to work on Sunday, claimed to be 
a Christian but was not a member of an established religious sect or church.  Id. at 831.  
The Court held that the denial of benefits violated Frazee’s religious rights under the 
Free Exercise Clause.  Id. at 834–35. 
 95. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 96. See supra text accompanying notes 38–39 (discussing Davis v. Beason, 133 
U.S. 333, 342 (1890), overruled by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)). 
MORRIS.DOC 2/12/2020  10:35 AM 
[VOL. 38:  973, 2001]  “God Told Me to Kill”  
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 989 
as a secular belief that would not qualify today under the “ever-broadening 
understanding of the modern religious community”97 described in the 
Seeger and Welsh cases.98  Even if other people believe that God would 
not order the killing of a human being by another human being, the 
Court in Thomas tells us that the person’s belief does not have to be 
acceptable, logical, or even comprehensible to others.99  Even if the 
person was not a member of an organized religious group at the time he 
or she acquired the belief,100 or converted from one religion to another or 
from atheism to belief in God as a result of the perceived communication,101 
the Free Exercise Clause protects this sincere, though newly acquired, 
religious belief. 
Religious beliefs are not limited to individuals who believe in one 
God.  Even in the limited statutory construction context of Seeger, Justice 
Douglas, concurring in the Court’s decision, noted: “The words ‘a Supreme 
Being’ have no narrow technical meaning in the field of religion.”102  He 
specifically identified Hinduism as a religion that conceives of the 
Supreme Being “in the forms of several cult Deities”103 and Buddhism as 
a religion that “tolerates a belief in many Gods.”104 
Religious beliefs are not limited to individuals who believe that God is 
good or that all gods are good.  If an individual sincerely believes that he 
or she has received a communication from the Devil or other omnipotent 
spirit of evil, then such belief satisfies the Seeger requirement of 
occupying a place parallel to that filled by the God of those who adhere 
to traditional religions. 
Although the Court in Thomas broadly interpreted the meaning of 
religious belief, the Chief Justice did suggest that “[o]ne can, of course, 
imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, 
 
 97. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 180 (1965). 
 98. See supra text accompanying notes 51–66 (discussing United States v. Seeger, 
380 U.S. 163 (1965) and Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970)). 
 99. See supra text accompanying notes 89–90 (discussing Thomas v. Review Bd., 
450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981)). 
 100. See supra text accompanying note 94 (discussing Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of 
Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989)). 
 101. In Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 480 U.S. 136, 144 (1987), 
the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause gives no different or less favorable 
protection to those “who adopt religious beliefs or convert from one faith to another.” 
 102. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 189 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 191. 
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as not to be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause.”105  
The Court did not elaborate further on this point, stating simply that the 
matter before the Court, involving a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
who claimed that his religious beliefs prevented him from producing war 
materials, was not such a case. 
Is a belief that God would speak to a person so bizarre as not to qualify 
as a religious belief?  In the first recorded Biblical communication between 
God and a human, the Book of Genesis informs us that “the Lord God 
commanded the man, saying: ‘Of every tree of the garden thou mayest 
freely eat; but of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not 
eat of it.”106  And after Adam and Eve had eaten the forbidden fruit, God 
spoke directly to them, informing them of the consequences of their 
sin.107  Often the Bible discusses conversations between God and mortals.  
After Cain slew Abel, “the Lord said unto Cain: ‘Where is Abel thy 
brother?’  And he said: ‘I know not; am I my brother’s keeper?’  And He 
said: ‘What hast thou done?  The voice of thy brother’s blood crieth unto 
Me from the ground.”108  The dialogue between them continues as God 
describes Cain’s punishment, and Cain responds by saying that the 
punishment is greater than he can bear.109  In another example, Abraham 
engages God in a lengthy negotiation to prevent the destruction of 
Sodom and Gomorrah so that the righteous will not be swept away with 
the wicked.110  After Abraham obtains God’s assurance that the city will 
not be destroyed if Abraham finds only ten righteous men, the passage 
ends by saying, “And the Lord went His way, as soon as He had left off 
speaking to Abraham; and Abraham returned unto his place.”111 
 
 
 105. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981).  Consider, for example, 
Brown v. Pena, 441 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D. Fla. 1977), aff’d, 589 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1979), 
in which the plaintiff claimed he was discriminated against because of his religious 
belief that Kozy Kitten Cat Food “‘is contributing significantly to [his] state of well 
being . . . [and therefore] to [his] overall work performance’ by increasing his energy.”  
Id. at 1383–84 (alterations in original).  The plaintiff’s claim was denied by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission.  Id. at 1383.  The federal district court, determining 
that the plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, denied the plaintiff’s motion to proceed against 
the EEOC in forma pauperis.  Id. at 1384–85.  The court characterized the plaintiff’s 
belief as “a mere personal preference and, therefore, . . . beyond the parameters of the 
concept of religion as protected by the constitution.”  Id.  But note that even in this case, 
the court was, in essence, characterizing the plaintiff’s claim as nonreligious in 
motivation, but not characterizing it as a bizarre belief. 
 106. Genesis 2:16–17. 
 107. Id. at 3:16–19. 
 108. Id. at 4:9–10. 
 109. Id. at 4:11–13.  Cain also expressed concern that he would be killed by 
whomever found him, to which God responded: “Therefore whosoever slayeth Cain, 
vengeance shall be taken on him sevenfold.”  Id.  4:14–15. 
 110. Id. at 18:20–32. 
 111. Id. at 18:33. 
MORRIS.DOC 2/12/2020  10:35 AM 
[VOL. 38:  973, 2001]  “God Told Me to Kill”  
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 991 
Some people read Biblical stories as allegories or metaphors, others 
read them as literal truth.112  If, as some people believe, God actually 
spoke to mere mortals in Biblical times then it is not bizarre to believe 
that God retains the capacity to speak to, and does speak to, people 
today. 
Is a belief that God would direct a person to kill another so bizarre as 
not to qualify as a religious belief?  Surely Abraham’s belief that God 
spoke to him and commanded him to sacrifice his only son is understood 
to be a religious belief.113  Abraham sincerely believed and acted upon 
God’s order, although at the last moment—like the cavalry arriving in an 
old Western movie—God intervened to reverse His deific decree. 
The sacrifice of an only son, Jesus Christ, is a core belief of 
Christianity.114  No one suggests that Pontius Pilate, who ordered the 
crucifixion of Jesus, was acting at the direction of God.  But the act was 
divinely inspired in order to enable those who believe to be redeemed 
from their sins.  The Gospel according to John explains: “For God so 
loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son, so that whoever 
believes in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life.”115  For this 
reason, the death of Jesus was required.  God did not intervene; there 
was no cavalry at Calvary. 
If God could countenance the death of Jesus, as millions of people 
believe today, then is a belief that God could order someone to kill 
another human being a bizarre belief?  We doubt it.  After all, aren’t the 
reasons for God’s actions beyond the comprehension of mere mortals?116  
A logical analysis of Biblical stories leads to the conclusion that a 
person’s sincere belief that God ordered him or her to kill qualifies as a 
religious belief. 
Religious beliefs, however, are not logical.  “Faith,” remarked social 
critic H.L. Mencken, is “an illogical belief in the occurrence of the 
improbable.”117  In United States v. Ballard,118 the Supreme Court 
 
 112. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 94 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 113. “And He said: ‘Take now thy son, thine only son, whom thou lovest, even 
Isaac, and get thee into the land of Moriah; and offer him there for a burnt-offering upon 
one of the mountains which I will tell thee of.’”  Genesis 22:2. 
 114. MILNER, supra note 8, at 334. 
 115. John 3:16. 
 116. See, for example, Exodus 33:18–23, in which Moses asks to learn the eternal 
qualities of God, and God responds by informing Moses that he cannot see God’s face 
and live.  God suggests, however, that Moses may know God through God’s achievements, 
saying that when God passes by, Moses can see God’s back. 
 117. H.L. Mencken, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 11, 1955, reprinted in THE GREAT 
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acknowledged that a person’s religious views may seem “incredible, if 
not preposterous, to most people.”119  Justice Douglas, writing for the 
majority, noted, however, that the Constitution does not permit us to 
conduct heresy trials designed to determine the truth or falsity of those 
beliefs.120  Philosopher-psychologist William James121 asserted that individual 
religious experiences give vitality to religion.  Among those experiences, 
he included: “conversations with the unseen, voices and visions.”122  Justice 
Jackson, quoting from James as he dissented in Ballard,123 asserted that 
it is “an impossible task . . . to separate fancied [experiences] from real ones, 
dreams from happenings, and hallucinations from true clairvoyance.  Such 
experiences, like some tones and colors, have existence for one, but none 
at all for another.”124 
D.  Beyond Belief: Defining the Free Exercise of Religion 
Religion, wrote Catherine Albanese, is “[m]ore than a form of belief, 
religion is a matter of practice, an action system.”125  The First 
Amendment prohibits governmental interference not just with religious 
belief but with the free exercise of religion.  In considering claims that a 
law prohibits an individual’s freedom of religious exercise, the Supreme 
Court’s standard for reviewing the constitutionality of the statute has 
fluctuated over the years from low level scrutiny to high level and back 
to low level again.126  Despite this vacillation, however, the Court has 
consistently upheld criminal laws that protect individuals from harmful 
 
QUOTATIONS 488 (George Seldes ed., 1983). 
 118. 322 U.S. 78 (1944). 
 119. Id. at 87. 
 120. Id. at 86. 
 121. James was “a leader of the philosophical movement of Pragmatism and of the 
psychological movement of functionalism.”  6 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 
487 (15th ed. 1998). 
 122. WILLIAM JAMES, Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results (1898), in 
COLLECTED ESSAYS AND REVIEWS 406, 428 (1920). 
 123. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 92–95 (Jackson, J., dissenting).  Justice Jackson did not 
dissent from the majority’s broad construction of religious belief.  He agreed with the 
majority that the truth or falsity of a person’s religious beliefs cannot be measured and 
should be withheld from jury consideration.  However, he did not agree with the majority 
that the case should be remanded to the court of appeals for a consideration of other 
questions, such as whether, in soliciting funds for their religion, the defendants actually 
had a good faith belief in the representations that they made.  Justice Jackson expressed 
concern that prosecution “could degenerate into religious persecution” if “less than full 
belief in a professed credo become[s] actionable fraud if one is soliciting gifts or 
legacies.”  Id. at 95. 
 124. Id. at 93. 
 125. ALBANESE, supra note 35, at 10. 
 126. See generally WITTE, supra note 20, at 120–25 (discussing standards of review 
applied by the Supreme Court in Free Exercise Clause cases). 
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conduct of religious believers.  For example, in 1878, the Supreme 
Court, applying a low level of scrutiny, upheld the constitutionality of a 
statute criminalizing bigamy and affirmed the criminal conviction of a 
Mormon who believed polygamy was his religious duty.127  Although 
the Court acknowledged that laws “cannot interfere with mere religious 
beliefs and opinions, they may with practices.”128  As an example of 
appropriate governmental action, the Court cited prohibition of human 
sacrifice as a part of religious worship.129  Thus, despite the defendant’s 
religious belief that it was his duty to practice polygamy and that the 
penalty for failing or refusing to do so was eternal damnation,130 the 
government could exercise its legitimate power to prohibit such 
practice.131  Even though the trial judge, in charging the jury, described 
the defendant’s belief as a delusion that inflicted suffering on pure-
minded women and innocent children, the Supreme Court found no 
appeal to the jurors’ passions or prejudices that warranted reversal of the 
criminal conviction.132 
Three years later, the Court explained why bigamy and polygamy are 
reviled and why society may impose criminal sanctions against those 
who engage in such practices despite their claims of religious exercise: 
They tend to destroy the purity of the marriage relation, to disturb the peace of 
families, to degrade woman and to debase man.  Few crimes are more 
pernicious to the best interests of society and receive more general or more 
deserved punishment.  To extend exemption from punishment for such crimes 
would be to shock the moral judgment of the community.  To call their 
advocacy a tenet of religion is to offend the common sense of mankind. . . . [The 
Free Exercise Clause] was never intended . . . as a protection against legislation 
for the punishment of acts inimical to the peace, good order and morals of 
society.133 
Sixty years later, in Cantwell v. Connecticut,134 the Court, for the first 
time, applied an intermediate standard of review to a free exercise claim.  
Freedom of belief, including decisions to join religious organizations 
 
 127. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161, 166, 168 (1878). 
 128. Id. at 166. 
 129. Id.  The Court also cited the example of governmental prohibition against a 
wife’s decision to throw herself on her husband’s funeral fire.  Id. 
 130. Id. at 161. 
 131. Id. at 166. 
 132. Id. at 167–68. 
 133. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341–42 (1890), overruled by Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 134. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
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and to worship in particular ways, are not subject to government 
action.135  However, the government may regulate other religious conduct 
through “general and non-discriminatory legislation”136 in order to “safeguard 
the peace, good order and comfort of the community.”137  Although the 
state may not inhibit the free exercise of religion by requiring the 
licensing of those who peacefully solicit contributions to support their 
religious views, the state may legitimately further its interest in public 
safety by enforcing a law prohibiting incitement to riot—even against 
religious believers.138  Religious liberty does not include the right to 
exhort others to physically attack nonbelievers.139 
In Prince v. Massachusetts,140 the Court, applying Cantwell’s 
intermediate standard of review, upheld the conviction of a member of 
the Jehovah’s Witnesses for violating a child labor law when she 
distributed religious literature in public places with her nine-year-old 
niece.  Society’s interest in protecting the welfare of children outweighs 
the defendant’s free exercise claim and her parental interest in raising 
her child.141  As the Court observed: “A democratic society rests, for its 
continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people 
into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies.  It may secure this 
against impeding restraints and dangers within a broad range of 
selection.”142 
In Sherbert v. Verner,143 the Court applied an even higher standard of 
review.  To pass constitutional muster, a statute that substantially 
infringes on religious exercise must further a compelling state interest.144  
The denial of unemployment benefits eligibility to a claimant who, 
based on her religious beliefs, refused to work on Saturdays did not meet 
this strict scrutiny standard.145  The statute impermissibly burdened her 
religious freedom by pressuring her to choose between forfeiting benefits if 
she followed her religious dictates, and abandoning her religious belief if 
she accepted work.146  No compelling state interest could be invoked to 
justify this Hobson’s choice. 
 
 135. Id. at 303. 
 136. Id. at 304. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 304–05. 
 139. Id. at 308. 
 140. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
 141. Id. at 165. 
 142. Id. at 168.  The Court also noted that it was in the child’s interest, as well as in 
the community’s interest, to “be both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities 
for growth into [a] free and independent well-developed . . . citizen[].”  Id. at 165. 
 143. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 144. Id. at 406. 
 145. Id. at 406–07. 
 146. Id. at 404. 
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In four post-Sherbert cases, the Supreme Court found that the government’s 
interest was compelling and that the legislation or government action 
survived strict scrutiny analysis.  In the first, the Court upheld a statute 
limiting conscientious objector status to those who oppose participation 
in all wars and not just a particular war, citing the government’s interests 
in: (1) procuring manpower for military purposes, and (2) administering 
the conscription laws fairly.147  In the second, the Court upheld a statute 
imposing social security taxes on employers who objected on religious 
grounds to paying taxes to support public insurance funds, citing the 
government’s interest in assuring the fiscal vitality of the Social Security 
system through mandatory contributions from employers and employees.148  
In the third, the Court again relied on the government’s interest in 
maintaining a sound tax system to uphold an Internal Revenue Service 
ruling that payments made to branch churches of the Church of 
Scientology for auditing and training sessions were not deductible as 
charitable contributions.149  In the fourth, the Court upheld an Internal 
Revenue Service ruling that denied tax-exempt status to private schools 
that used racially discriminatory admissions standards, citing the government’s 
interest in eliminating racial discrimination in education.150  Although 
none of these cases involved a free exercise challenge to a statute that 
prohibits murder and its application to one who kills for religious 
reasons, surely the state’s police power interest in protecting its citizenry 
from violence is at least equally, if not more, compelling. 
In 1990, the Supreme Court abandoned Sherbert’s strict scrutiny 
test,151 returning to a low standard of review reminiscent152 of the 
 
 147. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 454–60 (1971). 
 148. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258–60 (1982). 
 149. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 698–700 (1989). 
 150. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 592–96, 604 (1983). 
 151. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882–87 (1990).  The Court noted 
that the only cases in which the Court’s use of the Sherbert test had resulted in 
invalidation of governmental action were ones involving denial of unemployment 
compensation.  Id. at 883.  The Court suggested that the compelling governmental 
interest test is uniquely appropriate for unemployment compensation cases because such 
cases involve a consideration of the particular circumstances for an individual’s 
unemployment—a consideration of whether an individualized exemption is appropriate.  
Without a compelling reason, the state should not be able to refuse an exemption for 
cases of religious hardship.  Id. at 884.  Note, however, that the Smith case also involved 
denial of unemployment compensation.  Id. at 874. 
 152. See infra note 158 (suggesting that the Smith test is not identical with the 
rational basis test used to decide the Mormon polygamy cases in the nineteenth century). 
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rational basis test used by the Court to resolve the Mormon polygamy 
cases in the previous century.153  In Employment Division v. Smith, 
individuals who worked for a private drug rehabilitation organization 
were fired from their jobs for ingesting peyote as part of a Native American 
Church ceremony and were denied unemployment compensation 
because they were discharged for work-related misconduct.154  “We have 
never held,” wrote Justice Scalia for the majority, “that an individual’s 
religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid 
law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.  On the 
contrary, the record of more than a century of our free exercise 
jurisprudence contradicts that proposition.”155  The Court suggested that 
the constitutionally protected free exercise of religion includes worshiping 
with others in a religious service, using bread and wine for sacramental 
purposes, proselytizing, refusing to eat certain foods or travel using 
certain methods of transportation, casting statues for religious purposes 
or bowing down before them,156 and raising one’s children in the 
parent’s religion.157  Neutral laws of general application—such as the 
criminal law in the Smith case—are constitutional even if their incidental 
effect is to impose a burden on an individual’s religious practices.158 
Thus, the state may enforce its controlled substance laws against individuals 
who ingest peyote for sacramental purposes as part of their religious 
ceremony.159  Obviously under this test, the state may enforce its 
criminal laws prohibiting murder against one who kills under a religious 
belief that God told him or her to do so.160 
 
 153. See supra text accompanying notes 127–133. 
 154. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. 
 155. Id. at 878–79. 
 156. Id. at 877–78. 
 157. See id. at 882. 
 158. Id. at 878.  If a law that burdens religious practice is not neutral and of general 
application, the government must justify its use by proving a compelling state interest.  
Additionally, the law must be narrowly tailored to promote that interest.  Church of 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–32 (1993).  An 
ordinance enacted by the City of Hialeah that prohibited the sacrificial killing of animals 
while permitting secular killings was enacted to suppress the Santeria religion and could 
not withstand strict scrutiny.  Id. at 542, 546–47. 
Arguably, if laws prohibiting polygamy were enacted in the 1880s in order to prohibit 
a religious practice of Mormons, they might not qualify as neutral laws of general 
application under the Smith test.  Under Smith, they would be subject to strict scrutiny. 
 159. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
 160. Congress responded to Smith by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 
2000bb-4 (1994)).  Congress declared that its purpose was “to restore the compelling state 
interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner.”  Id. § 2000bb(b).  Without reconsidering the 
wisdom of its Smith decision, the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 
507 (1997), held the RFRA unconstitutional as “contradict[ing] vital principles necessary 
to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance.”  Id. at 536.  Congress 
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IV.  RELIGION AS DELUSION: DEIFIC DECREE AS INSANITY 
A.  Defining Insanity as the Inability to Distinguish Good                      
(Right) from Evil (Wrong) 
Our criminal law is premised on this assumption: Because people have 
the ability—the free will—to choose between socially acceptable and 
socially unacceptable behavior, they can be held responsible and 
punished when they engage in socially unacceptable behavior that 
violates the law.  An individual who lacks the ability to make the choice, 
however, is not blameworthy and is not an appropriate subject for 
punishment. 
As a test of criminal responsibility, the focus on the individual’s 
ability to distinguish good from evil can be traced to the Book of 
Genesis.161  “And the LORD God commanded the man, saying, ‘Of 
every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat; but of the tree of the 
knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day that 
thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.’”162  Perhaps the words 
“knowledge of good and evil” simply meant “knowledge of all things, 
both good and evil,” and were “not intended to depict man’s capacity for 
moral choice.”163  After all, as one Biblical commentator noted, “Adam 
would not have been made ‘in the image of God’ if he did not from the 
first possess the faculty of distinguishing between good and evil.  And if 
 
exceeded its authority under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. 
at 536.  Although Smith’s low level scrutiny is restored for free exercise claims involving 
state and local laws, the RFRA’s strict scrutiny test remains the law for free exercise 
claims involving federal laws.  The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether this two-
track approach will be allowed to continue.  WITTE, supra note 20, at 125. 
One author examines three cases involving state regulation of religious practices of 
Asian-Americans and concludes that the Smith and Boerne decisions allow “the religious 
practices of religious minorities [to be] suppressed simply because the majority fails to 
recognize their conduct as religious and deserving of free exercise protections.”  Eric 
Pruitt, Comment, Boerne and Buddhism: Reconsidering Religious Freedom and 
Religious Pluralism After Boerne v. Flores, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 689, 705 (2000).  
To assure that the religious practices of religious minorities receive equal respect with 
those of the religious majority, he advocates a restoration of Sherbert’s compelling 
government interest test.  Id. at 712. 
 161. Anthony Platt & Bernard L. Diamond, The Origins of the “Right and Wrong” 
Test of Criminal Responsibility and Its Subsequent Development in the United States: An 
Historical Survey, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1227, 1227–28, 1258 (1966). 
 162. Genesis 2:16–17.  For a discussion of why God did not carry out the threatened 
punishment but instead imposed a less severe penalty, see ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE 
GENESIS OF JUSTICE 27–47 (2000). 
 163. Platt & Diamond, supra note 161, at 1228. 
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he lacked such faculty, his obedience or disobedience to any command 
whatsoever could have no moral significance.”164  Clearly, Adam and 
Eve’s decision to eat from the forbidden tree was morally significant 
because it resulted in their expulsion from the Garden of Eden.165 
Nevertheless, that same commentator also noted: 
Unlike the beast, man has also a spiritual life, which demands the subordination 
of man’s desires to the law of God.  The will of God revealed in His Law is the 
one eternal and unfailing guide as to what constitutes good and evil—and not 
man’s instincts, or even his Reason . . . .166 
By this analysis, Adam and Eve were banished simply because they 
disobeyed God’s command, regardless of whether they knew why God 
commanded them.  Because they possessed the capacity to choose 
whether to obey, their decision to disobey the Divine command was evil 
in and of itself.  By acting contrary to God’s will, they were no longer 
innocent children; they were no longer indistinguishable from the other 
living creatures who dwelled in Eden. 
The insanity defense developed as a device to exclude from criminal 
responsibility those individuals who are unable to distinguish good from 
evil because their severe mental disorder disables them from doing so.  
Insanity, then, separates the “bad”—criminals who can be punished for 
their illegal conduct—from the “mad”—insane persons who engage in 
the same conduct, but who cannot be punished.167  Just as a young child 
is absolved from criminal liability if he or she lacks the ability to 
distinguish good from evil, so too is an insane person.168  For example, 
in Rex v. Arnold,169 decided in 1724, more than one-hundred years 
before M’Naghten,170 an English jury was instructed that if a person “is 
totally deprived of his understanding and memory, and doth not know 
 
 164. THE PENTATEUCH AND HAFTORAHS 10 n.5 (J.H. Hertz ed., 2d ed. 1960).  Dr. 
Hertz was the Chief Rabbi of the British Empire.  Id. at title page.   
 165. Genesis 3:23–24. 
 166. THE PENTATEUCH AND HAFTORAHS, supra note 164, at 8 n.17. 
 167. Although persons acquitted of crime by reason of insanity are not criminally 
responsible and cannot be punished, they may be, and usually are, confined for treatment 
to prevent repetition of the irresponsible behavior.  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026(a) 
(West 1985 & Supp. 2001); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d)(1) (1996).  In Jones v. United 
States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983), the Supreme Court upheld a statute that required insanity 
acquittees to be automatically committed to a mental hospital upon the completion of 
their criminal trial.  Id. at 366.  Insanity acquittees may be retained there until they are no 
longer insane or a danger to themselves or others.  Id. at 370. 
 168. See generally Platt & Diamond, supra note 161, at 1233–37 (discussing use of 
the “good and evil” test in English cases involving children and insane persons in the 
fourteenth through eighteenth centuries); id. at 1237–58 (discussing use of “good and 
evil” test in eighteenth century American cases). 
 169. Rex v. Arnold (C.P. 1724), in 16 T.B. HOWELL, A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF 
STATE TRIALS 695, 765 (1812). 
 170. Daniel M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843). 
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what he is doing, no more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast, 
such a one is never the object of punishment.”171 
Though wild beasts no longer roam our civilized Serengeti, the “good 
and evil” test reigns supreme today as our test of criminal responsibility.  
It does so, however, dressed in new garb.  In 1843, Daniel M’Naghten 
was accused of murdering Edward Drummond.  At trial, Lord Chief 
Justice Tindal charged the jury: 
The question to be determined is, whether at the time the act in question was 
committed, the prisoner had or had not the use of his understanding, so as to 
know that he was doing a wrong or wicked act.  If the jurors should be of 
opinion that the prisoner was not sensible, at the time he committed it, that he 
was violating the laws both of God and man, then he would be entitled to a 
verdict in his favour . . . .172 
In essence, the charge equated knowledge that the act was wrong with 
knowledge that the act was evil (wicked).  Because the killing of a 
human being was a violation both of God’s Sixth Commandment173 and 
society’s criminal law, there was no need for the judge to distinguish 
between them. 
The jury found M’Naghten not guilty by reason of insanity.174  In 
response, the House of Lords propounded five questions for the judges 
of the Supreme Court of Judicature designed to formulate a test of 
insanity to be applied in all future cases involving defendants “afflicted 
with insane delusion.”175  Lord Chief Justice Tindal’s answer articulated 
a “revised” test that recharacterized the “good and evil” test into a “right 
and wrong” test.  This test, known as the M’Naghten test even though it 
was not applied to M’Naghten himself, provides: 
[T]o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, 
at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under 
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and 
quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he 
was doing what was wrong.176 
 
 171. Rex v. Arnold (C.P. 1724), in 16 T.B. HOWELL, A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF 
STATE TRIALS 695, 765 (1812). 
 172. Daniel M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. at 719–20 (emphasis added). 
 173. Exodus 20:13 (“Thou shalt not murder.”). 
 174. Daniel M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. at 720. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 722. 
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The House of Lords thanked the judges, finding their answers to be 
“most highly satisfactory”177 and declaring that they would “be of the 
greatest use in the administration of justice.”178  The substitution of the 
phrase “right and wrong” for “good and evil” was not a revolutionary 
change, and, arguably, not even a significant one, for in the nineteenth 
century the phrases were used synonymously and interchangeably both 
in England and in the United States.179 
The M’Naghten test has been severely criticized for its narrow and 
exclusive focus on the defendant’s cognitive capacity to distinguish right 
from wrong.180  The test assumes that the mind is compartmentalized, 
although most psychiatrists believe that it is an integrated unit.181  In his 
treatise on insanity, noted nineteenth century psychiatrist Isaac Ray 
challenged M’Naghten’s exclusive focus on cognitive capacity, asserting: 
This is virtually saying to a man, “You are allowed to be insane; the disease is a 
visitation of Providence, and you cannot help it; but have a care how you 
manifest your insanity; there must be method in your madness.  Having once 
adopted your delusion, all the subsequent steps connected with it must be 
conformed to the strictest requirements of reason and propriety.  If you are 
caught tripping in your logic; if in the disturbance of your moral and intellectual 
perceptions you take a step for which a sane man would be punished, insanity 
will be no bar to your punishment.”182 
To broaden the test of insanity, some jurisdictions supplemented their 
M’Naghten test by adding an “irresistible impulse” component.183  A 
defendant was not criminally responsible if a mental disorder prevented 
the defendant from controlling his or her conduct, despite knowledge of 
the nature and quality of the act and an awareness that it was wrong.  In 
1962, the American Law Institute (ALI), in its Model Penal Code, 
 
 177. Id. at 724. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Platt & Diamond, supra note 161, at 1237. 
 180. See, e.g., Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1945).  The 
M’Naghten test is not without its defenders.  See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, Psychiatry 
in the Legal Process: “A Knife that Cuts Both Ways,” in THE PATH OF THE LAW FROM 
1967, at 71, 71–72 (Arthur E. Sutherland ed., 1968) (asserting that M’Naghten is a legal 
rule, not a medical model for responsibility); Joseph M. Livermore & Paul E. Meehl, The 
Virtues of M’Naghten, 51 MINN. L. REV. 789, 855–56 (1967) (asserting that M’Naghten 
has advantages for law, in identifying those who should be absolved from criminal 
responsibility because of a major cognitive impairment, and advantages for psychiatry, 
in distinguishing between those who suffer from psychoses and those who suffer only 
from neuroses). 
 181. See Jerome Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility, 65 YALE L.J. 761, 
775 (1956). 
 182. I. RAY, A TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 49 (Eric T. 
Carlson, ed., 5th  ed., Arno Press. 1976) (1871).  
 183. See generally Barbara A. Weiner, Mental Disability and the Criminal Law, in 
AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 693, 710 (Samuel 
Jan Brakel et al. eds., 3d ed. 1985). 
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proposed a reformulated insanity test that combined, and broadened 
slightly, M’Naghten’s focus on intellectual capacity and the “irresistible 
impulse” focus on volitional capacity.184 
The ALI test was favorably received and was adopted in a majority of 
states and by the courts of appeals in ten of the eleven federal judicial 
circuits.185  More radical tests of insanity have been proposed, such as 
the Durham “product” test186 and the Royal Commission’s “justly 
responsible” test,187 but they have not been widely accepted.188  Nevertheless, 
John Hinckley’s attempted assassination of President Reagan on March 
 
 184. The ALI test provides: “A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at 
the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial 
capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform 
his conduct to the requirements of law.”  MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962). 
Abraham Goldstein hailed the ALI test as a sensible compromise between the 
traditional M’Naghten and irresistible impulse tests and the more radical-appearing 
insanity test announced by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), overruled 
by United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).  ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, 
THE INSANITY DEFENSE 93 (1967).  Under the Durham test, a defendant is “not 
criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental 
defect.”  Durham, 214 F.2d at 874–75.  Goldstein declared that the ALI test 
is a modernized and much improved rendition of M’Naghten and the “control” 
tests.  It substitutes “appreciate” for “know,” thereby indicating a preference 
for the view that a sane offender must be emotionally as well as intellectually 
aware of the significance of his conduct.  And it uses the word “conform” 
instead of “control,” while avoiding any reference to the misleading words 
“irresistible impulse.”  In addition, it requires only “substantial” incapacity, 
thereby eliminating the occasional references in the older cases to “complete” 
or “total” destruction of the normal capacity of the defendant. 
GOLDSTEIN, supra, at 87. 
 185. See Weiner, supra note 183, at 769–77 tbl.12.5 (listing states that adopted the 
ALI test).  The ALI test was adopted by all of the federal circuit courts of appeals except 
the first circuit.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmt. at 176 n.34 (1962) (citing cases). 
 186. Durham, 214 F.2d 862, 874–75 (D.C. Cir. 1954), overruled by United States v. 
Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see supra note 184.  Actually, the “product” 
test was first accepted, more than eighty years before Durham, in a New Hampshire 
Supreme Court decision.  State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 370 (1871). 
 187. ROYAL COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1949–1953 REPORT 116 (1953) 
(“[A] preferable amendment of the law would be to abrogate the [M’Naghten] Rules and 
to leave the jury to determine whether at the time of the act the accused was suffering 
from disease of the mind (or mental deficiency) to such a degree that he ought not to be 
held responsible.”). 
 188. In United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc), the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit overruled its 
eighteen-year-old Durham decision, and adopted the ALI test instead.  Chief Justice 
Bazelon, who authored the Durham opinion, concurred in the Brawner decision.  He did 
not favor retaining the Durham “product” test but preferred instead to adopt a variant of 
the “justly responsible” test.  Id. at 1010, 1032. 
MORRIS.DOC 2/12/2020  10:35 AM 
 
1002 
30, 1981, and his subsequent successful use of an ALI-based insanity 
defense, triggered legislative efforts to restrict the insanity test.  Several 
states abandoned their ALI test and returned to the narrowly-focused 
M’Naghten definition.189  In 1984, Congress enacted a M’Naghten 
variant as the first federal legislation embodying an insanity defense for 
federal crimes.190  M’Naghten has reascended to a position of dominance 
as a test for insanity.191 
B.  The Deific Decree Doctrine 
1.  Historical Development 
Throughout history, religion and mental disorder have been closely 
linked.192  In fact, at one time mental disorder was believed to be a 
condition inflicted  by God, perhaps as a deific punishment193 for some 
mortal sin.194  Euripides, for example, who lived in the fifth century 
B.C., is credited with saying: “Those whom God wishes to destroy, he 
first makes mad.”195  In 1685, in challenging the execution of a mentally 
disordered person convicted of high treason, England’s Solicitor-General 
noted: “[A] lunatick during his lunacy, is by an act of God . . . 
 
 189. See Lisa Callahan et al., Insanity Defense Reform in the United States—Post-
Hinckley, 11 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 54 (1987) (discussing changes in 
insanity defense laws in various states during and after the Hinckley trial).  For example, 
California voters approved an initiative restoring the M’Naghten test.  CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 25(b) (West 1999) (added by Initiative Measure, approved by the people, June 8, 
1982). 
 190. Under the federal statute, the defendant must prove, by clear and convincing 
evidence, 18 U.S.C. § 17(b) (1994), that he, “as a result of a severe mental disease or 
defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts.” 
Id. § 17(a). 
 191. One author declared that “M’Naghten is the bedrock of American insanity 
jurisprudence.”  Christopher Hawthorne, Comment, “Deific Decree”: The Short, Happy 
Life of a Pseudo-Doctrine, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1755, 1769 (2000).  He noted that other 
insanity tests, such as the Durham test or the ALI test, “add or change elements of 
M’Naghten [and thus] are tied to M’Naghten because they must react to it.”  Id. 
 192. See supra text accompanying notes 161–71 (tracing the evolution of the 
M’Naghten insanity test to Adam and Eve’s original sin). 
 193. Blackstone asserted, as one reason why a mentally disordered person should 
not be executed, that “furiosus solo furore punitur,” i.e., madness is its own punishment.  
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *389.  Justice Marshall, writing the opinion of 
the Court in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 407–08 (1986), cited and relied in part 
on the Blackstone quotation.  The Ford Court ruled that “[t]he Eighth Amendment 
prohibits the State from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane.” Id. 
at 410. 
 194. While people believed that God would and could inflict mental disorder as 
punishment for wrongdoing, they acknowledged an inability to comprehend why God 
would inflict such a punishment.  See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 195. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 69 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992). 
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disabled.”196  More than one hundred years before M’Naghten, the court 
in Rex v. Arnold,197 in applying the wild beast test of insanity, instructed 
the jury that in evaluating the defendant’s mental condition: 
If he was under the visitation of God, and could not distinguish between good 
and evil, and did not know what he did, though he committed the greatest 
offence, yet he could not be guilty of any offence against any law whatsoever; 
for guilt arises from the mind, and the wicked will and intention of the man.198 
Although witnesses testified that the defendant believed that the victim 
of the shooting “bewitched” him199 and “sent into his chamber devils and 
imps,”200 no evidence was introduced to suggest that the defendant 
believed that God commanded that he shoot the victim.  Apparently, the 
words “visitation of God” in the court’s instruction referred to the 
defendant’s claim that he acted as a result of mental disorder—a 
condition that he suffered from involuntarily. 
The “deific decree doctrine” regards a criminal defendant’s belief that 
God commanded him or her to kill, not as a religious belief, but rather, 
as a delusion that qualifies as legal insanity, exculpating the defendant 
from criminal responsibility.  Perhaps, as one author suggests,201 the 
doctrine developed from a literal reading of the Rex v. Arnold “visitation 
of God” language.  If God “visits” a person, such visitation can take the 
form of an oral communication with that person. 
Perhaps the doctrine was merely a logical extension of the Judeo-
Christian belief that God would not order a person to kill another.  After 
all, God’s Sixth Commandment prohibits individuals from committing 
 
 196. Sir John Hawles, Remarks on the Trial of Charles Bateman, in 11 T.B. 
HOWELL, A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 474, 476 (1811).  Charles Bateman 
was tried and convicted of high treason on December 9, 1685, sentenced on December 
11, 1685, and executed on December 18, 1685.  The Trial of Charles Bateman (Old 
Bailey 1685), in HOWELL, supra, at 467, 474.  Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in Solesbee 
v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), quoted from Sir John 
Hawles’ remarks in the trial of Charles Bateman.  Id. at 18. 
 197. Rex v. Arnold (C.P. 1724), in 16 T.B. HOWELL, A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF 
STATE TRIALS 695, 764 (1812).   
 198. Id. at 764.  The jury, however, convicted the defendant of maliciously and 
wilfully shooting at and wounding Lord Onslow.  The prisoner was sentenced to death, 
but at the intercession of Lord Onslow, the execution was stayed, and the prisoner was 
confined in jail for more than thirty years until his death.  Id. at 766. 
 199. Id. at 721 (testimony of William Arnold, brother of the defendant); id. at 729 
(testimony of Eleanor Gittings). 
 200. Id. at 729. 
 201. Hawthorne, supra note 191, at 1783. 
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murder.202  Thus, one who sincerely believes that he or she is commanded 
by God to kill another, is experiencing a false belief.  A societal belief 
that a “good” God would not order murder would explain why 
nineteenth century courts and juries would not exculpate as insane those 
who claimed to act at the direction of the Devil or other “evil” diety.203  
To that society, religious belief was limited to the One True God.204  
Perhaps the doctrine was simply a convenient mechanism for courts, 
constrained by the narrow cognitive focus of the M’Naghten test, to add 
a volitional component—broadening the insanity test to include at least 
some individuals (the religiously deluded) who were unable to control 
their conduct. 
Whatever its origin, the deific decree doctrine became established in 
American criminal jurisprudence as a result of two nineteenth century 
and one early twentieth century cases.  Ironically, the deific decree 
doctrine was not used successfully to achieve an insanity acquittal in any 
of the three. 
Commonwealth v. Rogers,205 decided by the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts in 1844, is acknowledged as the first American case to 
cite the M’Naghten test.206  Abner Rogers, Jr. was charged with murdering 
 
 202. Exodus 20:13. 
 203. In Diana Sellick’s Case, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816), in 1 N.Y. CITY-HALL RECORDER 
185 (Dennis & Co. 1953) (1817), the defendant, charged with the poisoning death of a 
child, claimed insanity as a defense because “she was possessed with the devil, and knew 
not what she did.”  Id. at 190.  In instructing the jury, the judge rejected the defendant’s 
claim, stating: “Can we reasonably look for any other motive than that laid in the 
indictment?”  Id.  The jury convicted the defendant, and the judge sentenced her to death.  
Id. at 191. 
Although the Thugs did not claim to act at the direct command of their goddess Kali, 
nevertheless, the persecution of the Thugs and elimination of their religion in the 1800s 
can be attributed to the prevailing (British) belief that Kali was a false god and that the 
Thug religion was a false religion.  See discussion supra note 8. 
 204. See supra text accompanying notes 38–71 (tracing, through Supreme Court 
decisions, the evolution of a broader concept of religious belief). 
 205. 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500 (1844). 
 206. In the case, Chief Justice Shaw, writing the opinion of the court, articulated the 
insanity test as follows: 
A man is not to be excused from responsibility, if he has capacity and reason 
sufficient to enable him to distinguish between right and wrong, as to the 
particular act he is then doing; a knowledge and consciousness that the act he 
is doing is wrong and criminal, and will subject him to punishment. 
Id. at 501–02.  Later in the opinion, Chief Justice Shaw seemingly combined M’Naghten’s 
cognitive test with the irresistible impulse’s lack of control test when he wrote: 
If then it is proved, to the satisfaction of the jury, that the mind of the accused 
was in a diseased and unsound state, the question will be, whether the disease 
existed to so high a degree, that for the time being it overwhelmed the reason, 
conscience, and judgment, and whether the prisoner, in committing the 
homicide, acted from an irresistible and uncontrollable impulse: If so, then the 
act was not the act of a voluntary agent, but the involuntary act of the body, 
without the concurrence of a mind directing it. 
MORRIS.DOC 2/12/2020  10:35 AM 
[VOL. 38:  973, 2001]  “God Told Me to Kill”  
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1005 
the warden of the state prison by stabbing him with a knife.207  Although 
the defendant did not claim to have acted at the direction of God, Chief 
Justice Lemuel Shaw, in discussing the type of delusion that could result 
in a successful insanity defense, wrote: 
A common instance is where he fully believes that the act he is doing is done by 
the immediate command of God, and he acts under the delusive but sincere 
belief that what he is doing is by the command of a superior power, which 
supersedes all human laws, and the laws of nature.208 
Although the defendant was acquitted by reason of insanity,209 he did not 
rely upon the deific decree doctrine to achieve that result. 
In 1882, Charles Guiteau, on trial for assassinating President James 
Garfield, relied upon the insanity defense, claiming to have acted under 
a deific decree delusion.210  In instructing the jury, Judge Walter Cox 
cited Chief Justice Shaw’s example of a deific decree delusion211 and 
then added an example of his own: 
[A] man, whom you know to be an affectionate father, insists that the Almighty 
has appeared to him and commanded him to sacrifice his child.  No reasoning 
has convinced him of his duty to do it, but the command is as real to him as my 
voice is now to you.  No reasoning or remonstrance can shake his conviction or 
deter him from his purpose.  This is an insane delusion, the coinage of a 
diseased brain, as seems to be generally supposed, which defies reason and 
ridicule, which palsies the reason, blindfolds the conscience, and throws into 
disorder all the springs of human action.212 
Judge Cox, applying the M’Naghten test, specifically instructed the 
jury that if the defendant “was under an insane delusion that the 
Almighty had commanded him to do the act, and in consequence of that 
he was incapable of seeing that it was a wrong thing to do,213—then he 
was not in a responsible condition of mind . . . and ought to be now 
acquitted.”214  Although a deific decree delusion was accepted as an 
example of legal insanity in an appropriate case, Judge Cox reviewed 
 
Id. at 502. 
 207. Id. at 501. 
 208. Id. at 503. 
 209. Id. at 506. 
 210. Guiteau’s Case, 10 F. 161, 176 (C.C.D.C. 1882). 
 211. Id. at 170. 
 212. Id. at 172. 
 213. Earlier in his charge, Judge Cox informed the jury: “If a man insanely believes 
that he has a command from the Almighty to kill, it is difficult to understand how such a 
man can know that it is wrong for him to do it.”  Id. at 182. 
 214. Id. at 186. 
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testimony introduced in the case before him and strongly suggested that 
a verdict of insanity was not appropriate for Charles Guiteau.  For 
example, three psychiatrists who examined the defendant testified that 
he informed them that the idea for the assassination was his own and not 
the result of a vision, or voice, or command from God.215  The defendant’s 
own testimony confirmed that his conception of the facts was not 
distorted by any deific revelation.216  The jury deliberated for just over 
one hour and returned a guilty verdict.217 
In 1915, Justice Benjamin Cardozo, writing for the New York Court 
of Appeals in People v. Schmidt,218 assured the viability of the deific 
decree doctrine.  Cardozo’s influence on American law is so great that 
one author asserted: “[I]t is . . . safe to say that, if another judge had 
written the Schmidt opinion, deific decree would not exist.”219  The 
defendant, Hans Schmidt, confessed to killing a woman by cutting her 
throat and to dismembering her body.220  At trial, he claimed insanity as 
a defense, asserting “that he had heard the voice of God calling upon 
him to kill the woman as a sacrifice and atonement.”221  The jury, 
believing his delusion was feigned, convicted him of first degree murder, 
and he was sentenced to death.222  On appeal, he recanted his confession 
and acknowledged that he feigned insanity in order to conceal an illegal 
abortion that resulted in the victim’s death.  He had hoped that a 
successful insanity defense would result in only a brief stay in a mental 
hospital.  Now he sought a new trial that could result, at most, in a 
manslaughter conviction.223  The defendant’s appeal, wrote Justice 
Cardozo, did not qualify as newly discovered evidence that would 
 
 215. Id. at 179.  For example, one psychiatrist testified that in response to a question 
of whether the defendant claimed to have had any direct revelation from heaven, the 
defendant answered that he “did not believe in any such nonsense.”  Id. 
 216. Id. at 178.  The defendant also wrote two papers shortly after the assassination 
in which he stated that the act “was his own conception, and he took the entire 
responsibility.”  Id. at 180. 
 217. Id. at 187.  The jury was polled and after each juror announced a finding of 
“guilty,” the defendant stated: “My blood be on the head of that jury; don’t you forget it.  
That is my answer.”  Id. at 188.  After a short pause, he added: “God will avenge this 
outrage.”  Id. at 189. 
 218. 110 N.E. 945 (N.Y. 1915). 
 219. Hawthorne, supra note 191, at 1784.  An historian noted that “Cardozo was 
widely regarded as a man who embodied virtue, benevolence, and a remarkable kind of 
purity.”  Richard Polenberg, The “Saintly” Cardozo: Character and the Criminal Law, 
71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1311, 1311 (2000).  He added: “[C]ontemporaries often spoke 
about Cardozo in reverential, even worshipful, terms.  People compared him to St. Paul, 
St. Francis of Assisi, and Thomas More.”  Id. 
 220. Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 945. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
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warrant a new trial.224 
Although Cardozo could have ended his opinion at that point, he 
chose to address another issue raised by the defendant—that the trial 
judge erred in narrowly defining the word “wrong” in New York’s 
insanity statute to mean “contrary to the law of the state.”225  Most of 
Cardozo’s opinion focuses on this issue, explaining why the statute 
should be more broadly interpreted to mean moral wrong not just legal 
wrong.226  In his analysis, Justice Cardozo mentioned both Chief Justice 
Shaw’s and Judge Cox’s examples of a deific decree delusion and then 
added one of his own: 
A mother kills her infant child to whom she has been devotedly attached.  She 
knows the nature and quality of the act; she knows that the law condemns it; but 
she is inspired by an insane delusion that God has appeared to her and ordained 
the sacrifice.  It seems a mockery to say that, within the meaning of the statute, 
she knows that the act is wrong.227 
To Cardozo, the deific decree example presented the strongest case for 
finding the defendant insane.  Nothing in the history of the M’Naghten 
test, wrote Cardozo, or in its reason or purpose, justifies holding the 
defendant criminally responsible—a conclusion that Cardozo termed 
“abhorrent.”228  Cardozo even suggested that to avoid convicting such a 
defendant, the jury might well disregard a judge’s instruction limiting 
insanity to cases in which the defendant did not even know that his or 
her act was contrary to law.229  Cardozo used the deific decree paradigm, 
not to create an exception to the M’Naghten test, but to justify an 
interpretation of M’Naghten that would absolve from criminal 
responsibility those mentally disordered defendants who believe their 
criminal act is moral, even if they know the act is illegal.  Those 
defendants do not know their act is wrong. 
Cardozo answered a question that the M’Naghten judges did not 
address.  In response to questions posed by the House of Lords, the 
M’Naghten judges wrote that a defendant is criminally responsible if he 
does an act knowing that it was contrary to the law of the land.230  They 
also wrote that the jury should be informed that a defendant is criminally 
 
 224. Id. at 946. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 946–50. 
 227. Id. at 949. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Daniel M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843). 
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responsible if he does an act that is contrary to the law of the land and 
the defendant knows “that the act was one which he ought not to do,”231 
that is, that he knew “that he was doing an act that was wrong.”232  The 
judges did not, however, say whether a defendant is insane if he or she 
knows the act is illegal, but who, through mental disorder, believes the 
act to be moral. 
Cardozo’s answer to that question did not apply to the defendant in the 
case before him.  Hans Schmidt was not inspired by an insane delusion 
that God had appeared to him and ordained a human sacrifice.  Rather, 
Schmidt had attempted to defraud the court with a fabricated defense of 
insanity and could not avail himself of the trial judge’s erroneous charge.  
The defendant was not unjustly convicted because, by his own 
admission, the jury correctly determined that he was sane at the time he 
acted.233 
The deific decree doctrine, though firmly established by Cardozo’s 
loving parent example (with an assist by Judge Cox’s similar example 
thirty-three years earlier), is rarely claimed,234 and when claimed, is 
rarely successful.  Apparently, there are few devoted mothers or affectionate 
fathers who either hear God’s command to sacrifice their children, or 
who respond obediently if they do.  One researcher, reviewing over 
eighty citations to Schmidt between 1915 and 1983, found no references 
to the deific decree doctrine, or to a semantic equivalent, during that 
sixty-eight-year period.235  Nevertheless, since 1983, appellate courts have 
 
 231. Id. at 723. 
 232. Id.  
 233. Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 950. 
 234. Although delusions were predominantly religious in content in the mid-
nineteenth century, patient records from Bethlem Royal Hospital reveal that delusions 
were predominantly sexual 100 years later.  Franklin S. Klaf & John G. Hamilton, 
Schizophrenia—A Hundred Years Ago and Today, 107 J. MENTAL SCI. 819, 821 tbl.1  
(1961).  “Three times as many male and female acute schizophrenics had religious 
preoccupations in the nineteenth century as compared with the twentieth century group.”  
Id. at 823.  The authors speculate: 
It does not seem strange that a mid-nineteenth century adult, having been 
trained to flee the fires of Hell since childhood, should hear God’s voice and 
fear His retribution after developing a schizophrenic illness.  Or, to draw an 
analogy, that may or may not be far-fetched, the mid-twentieth century adult, 
exposed to our society’s preoccupation with sex, may be expected to develop 
sexual preoccupations during a schizophrenic illness.  We wish to point out 
that such preoccupations may be culturally determined. 
Id. at 824. 
 235. Hawthorne, supra note 191, at 1799.  But see State v. Di Paolo, 168 A.2d 401 
(N.J. 1961).  In Di Paolo, the defendant claimed that he heard the voice of God directing 
him to kill his girlfriend, who had refused to marry him.  He stabbed her to death.  
Charged with murder, he claimed insanity based on this deific decree delusion.  Expert 
testimony was in conflict, and the jury rejected the insanity defense, convicting the 
defendant of murder in the first degree.  Id. at 403, 407.  In its Di Paolo opinion, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court specifically discusses Justice Cardozo’s opinion in Schmidt.  
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considered and applied the deific decree doctrine in at least ten cases.236  In 
 
Id. at 407–08. 
 236. See Ivery v. State, 686 So. 2d 495 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996); People v. 
Coddington, 2 P.3d 1081 (Cal. 2000), overruled by Price v. Superior Court, 25 P.3d 618 
(Cal. 2001) (overruled on different grounds); People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128 (Colo. 
1992); People v. Tally, 7 P.3d 172 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999); People v. Wilhoite, 592 
N.E.2d 48 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Laney v. State, 486 So. 2d 1242 (Miss. 1986); State v. 
Blair, 732 A.2d 448 (N.H. 1999); Galloway v. State, 698 P.2d 940 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1985); State v. Cameron, 674 P.2d 650 (Wash. 1983); State v. Potter, 842 P.2d 481 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1992). 
In Ivery, the defendant “believed himself to be the ‘ninja of God,’ and to have been 
instructed by God to kill people at will and to take their money as the spoils of victory.”  
Ivery, 686 So. 2d at 500.  The jury convicted the defendant of murder and sentenced him 
to death for decapitating a robbery victim with a hatchet.  The Alabama Court of 
Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction but remanded the case for reconsideration of 
sentencing.  Id. at 520. 
In Coddington, the defendant claimed that God commanded or authorized him to kill.  
Coddington, 2 P.3d at 1111.  The jury convicted him of first degree murder for killing 
two elderly women and for forcible rape and other sexual offenses on two girls under 
their supervision, and he was sentenced to death.  Id. at 1103.  The California Supreme 
Court affirmed.  Id. 
In Serravo, the defendant believed God told him to stab his wife in order to sever their 
marriage bond.  Serravo, 823 P.2d at 131.  The jury found the defendant insane.  Id. at 
130.  The Colorado Supreme Court did not order a retrial despite error in jury 
instructions.  Id. at 140. 
In Tally, the defendant believed God gave him permission to kill the victim, an 
employee at a company at which defendant had been fired.  Tally, 7 P.3d at 174–75.  The 
defendant shot the victim six times with an automatic pistol.  Id. at 174.  The jury 
convicted the defendant of first degree murder.  Id. at 175.  The Colorado Court of 
Appeals affirmed.  Id. at 174. 
In Wilhoite, the “[d]efendant believed the world was coming to an end; and that God 
had commanded her to kill her children so that they could find peace in heaven.”  
Wilhoite, 592 N.E.2d at 55.  The defendant attempted to push her nine-year-old daughter 
out the window of her eighth floor apartment.  Id. at 49.  The trial court, sitting without a 
jury, convicted the defendant of attempted murder.  Id.  The Illinois Appellate Court 
reversed, holding that the trial court’s decision that the defendant was not insane (under 
the state’s ALI insanity test) was against the manifest weight of the evidence.  Id. at 58. 
In Laney, the defendant claimed that God commanded him to kill two sheriff’s officers 
who had come to his home to transport him to a mental health clinic for an evaluation.  
He shot and killed one officer and wounded the other.  Laney, 486 So. 2d at 1243–45.  
The jury convicted the defendant of murder.  Id. at 1243.  The Mississippi Supreme 
Court affirmed.  Id. at 1247. 
In Blair, the defendant planned to kill his wife and son in a motel room they had 
previously visited while on vacation.  Blair, 732 A.2d at 449.  The defendant testified 
that “he experienced a trance ‘where God revealed to [him] that [he] would be cast into 
the lake of fire if [he] backed . . . away from it.’”  Id.  The defendant killed his wife and 
son by bludgeoning them to death with a hammer.  Id.  The jury convicted him of first 
degree murder.  The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed.  Id. 
In Galloway, the defendant claimed that God directed him to drive demons out of his 
neighbor.  Galloway, 698 P.2d at 941.  The defendant repeatedly shot, stabbed, and beat 
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four of the ten, the defendant used the doctrine successfully.237  In at least 
seven other cases involving criminal behavior inspired by nondeific 
decree delusions or nondelusional, but religiously motivated conduct, 
appellate courts contrasted that behavior with behavior inspired by a 
deific decree delusion, impliedly accepting the deific decree doctrine.238  
 
the victim.  The jury convicted him of first degree murder.  Id.  The Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that failure of the defense attorney to 
introduce evidence of the deific decree delusion denied the defendant effective assistance 
of counsel.  The court found that if such evidence had been presented, a substantial 
possibility existed that the defendant would have been found insane.  Id. at 942. 
In Cameron, the defendant believed God commanded him to kill his stepmother, who 
was Satan’s angel.  Cameron, 674 P.2d at 653.  He stabbed her more than seventy times.  
Id. at 651.  The jury convicted him of first degree murder.  Id.  The Washington Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that the word 
“wrong” in the insanity defense means “contrary to the law.”  Id. at 656. 
In Potter, the defendant claimed to have acted under a deific command to kill his wife.  
Potter, 842 P.2d at 483.  He strangled her.  Id. at 482.  The jury convicted him of second 
degree murder.  The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed.  Id. 
 237. See People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128 (Colo. 1992); People v. Wilhoite, 592 
N.E.2d 48 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Galloway v. State, 698 P.2d 940 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985) 
(reversing conviction in case in which the deific decree issue was raised on appeal to 
demonstrate incompetence of counsel for failing to raise issue at trial); State v. Cameron, 
674 P.2d 650 (Wash. 1983). 
 238. See People v. Skinner, 704 P.2d 752 (Cal. 1985); People v. Galimanis, 944 
P.2d 626 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Wilson, 700 A.2d 633 (Conn. 1997); State v. 
Worlock, 569 A.2d 1314 (N.J. 1990); Olivier v. State, 850 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1993); State v. Rice, 757 P.2d 889 (Wash. 1988); State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488 
(Wash. 1983). 
In Skinner, the defendant believed that the marriage vow “till death do us part” 
bestowed on a person a God-given right to kill a spouse who violated, or who was 
inclined to violate, the marital vows.  Skinner, 704 P.2d at 754–55.  He also believed that 
because the vows reflected the direct wishes of God, the killing was sanctified by God 
and was not morally wrongful.  Id. at 755.  The defendant strangled his wife while he was on 
a day pass from a state hospital.  Id. at 754.  The defendant was convicted of second 
degree murder.  Id.  The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defendant 
was insane because he could not distinguish right and wrong at the time he acted.  Id. at 
764. 
In Galimanis, the defendant felt God-like at times and referred to himself as the Devil.  
Galimanis, 944 P.2d at 628.  The defendant beat, stabbed, and decapitated a woman and 
stole her car.  Id.  The jury convicted him of “first-degree murder, motor vehicle theft, 
and crime of violence.”  Id. at 626.  The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting 
the defendant’s contention that a deific decree delusion instruction should have been 
given.  Id. at 632.  No evidence was introduced at trial that the defendant felt he was 
under any compulsion from God to kill the victim.  Id. 
In Wilson, the defendant had a delusional belief that his son and an acquaintance were 
systematically destroying his life by poisoning him with methamphetamine and 
hypnotizing him to control his thoughts.  Wilson, 700 A.2d at 636.  The defendant shot 
the acquaintance numerous times with a revolver.  Id.  The jury convicted the defendant 
of murder, and he was sentenced to sixty years’ imprisonment.  Id.  The Connecticut 
Supreme Court, construing the cognitive prong of the ALI insanity test, reversed, 
holding that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury that the defendant did not 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct if, at the time he acted, “he did not have the 
substantial capacity to appreciate that his actions were contrary to societal morality, even 
though he may have been aware that the conduct in question was criminal.”  Id. at 643. 
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In all likelihood, deific decree cases have also been resolved at the trial 
level, either with guilty verdicts that were not appealed or with insanity 
 
In Worlock, the defendant, infuriated at two “friends” for stealing his wallet, shot and 
killed them with twelve shots from a rifle.  Worlock, 569 A.2d at 1316.  The jury 
convicted the defendant of murder and possession of a weapon for an illegal purpose.  Id.  
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “[b]elief in an idiosyncratic code 
of morality does not constitute the defense of criminal insanity.”  Id. at 1324. 
In Olivier, the defendant, experiencing hallucinations and delusions, believed the 
world was coming to an end and that she was going to hell.  Believing also that her 
fourteen-month-old infant had turned into Satan and was trying to kill her, the defendant 
killed her child by choking her and beating her head against a wall.  Olivier, 850 S.W.2d 
at 743–44.  The jury convicted the defendant of murder and “assessed punishment at 
twenty (20) years confinement.”  Id. at 743.  The Texas Court of Appeals reversed, 
concluding that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.  Id. at 749.  The 
prosecution had not presented any expert testimony to contradict the testimony of the 
defendant’s three experts.  Id. 
In Rice, the defendant claimed that he had received extraterrestrial communications 
that urged him to follow certain laid-out paths.  Rice, 757 P.2d at 897.  He also believed 
he was in a war against evil.  Id.  The defendant used a knife and a steam iron to kill a 
man, his wife, and their two sons in their home.  Id. at 892–95.  The jury convicted the 
defendant of four counts of aggravated first degree murder, and he was sentenced to 
death.  Id. at 891–92.  The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a deific 
decree instruction is not appropriate if the defendant’s free will is not subsumed by his 
belief in the deific decree.  The testimony established that the defendant did not feel 
compelled to follow his urges.  Id. at 892, 904. 
In Crenshaw, the defendant, who professed to follow the Moscovite religion, believed 
that it would not be improper to kill his wife if she committed adultery.  Crenshaw, 659 
P.2d at 491.  The defendant stabbed his wife twenty-four times with a knife and 
decapitated her with an ax.  Id. at 490.  The jury convicted the defendant of first degree 
murder.  Id.  The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a person’s religious 
“beliefs are not equivalent to a deific decree.”  Id. at 494.  The defendant failed to prove 
that his alleged delusion stemmed from a mental disorder.  Id. at 495. 
For similar cases decided before 1983, see, for example, State v. Malumphy, 461 P.2d 
677 (Ariz. 1969); People v. Wood, 187 N.E.2d 116 (N.Y. 1962).  In Malumphy, the 
defendant contemplated suicide but decided to kill someone else so he could be tried for 
murder and given the death penalty.  Malumphy, 461 P.2d at 678.  He expressed a belief 
that his conduct was sanctioned by God.  Id.  He shot and killed two co-employees.  Id.  
The jury convicted the defendant of two counts of first degree murder, and he was 
sentenced to death.  The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed.  Id.  A concurring justice 
explained that the evidence in the case did not establish that the “defendant was unable 
to understand [that] it was wrong for him to kill” the victims.  Id. at 689–90 (McFarland, 
J., concurring). 
In Wood, the defendant believed he was “God’s emissary” and was charged with 
killing those whom he believed to be degenerates.  Wood, 187 N.E.2d at 120.  The 
defendant killed two men, using a beer bottle on one (severing his jugular vein with 
broken glass after knocking him unconscious) and beating the other on the head with a 
heavy shovel.  Id. at 118–19.  The jury convicted the defendant of two counts of first 
degree murder.  Id. at 117.  The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the 
jury “could reasonably have found that defendant was operating under a standard of 
morality he had set up for himself and which applied only to him.”  Id. at 122. 
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verdicts that were not appealable due to double jeopardy concerns.239 
2.  The Doctrine Denounced and Defended 
The deific decree doctrine, though applied uncritically by courts in the 
few cases that come before them, has been the subject of severe scholarly 
criticism.  The author of a recent article asserts that the doctrine undermines 
the M’Naghten test of insanity.240  The law presumes that everyone 
experiences the same reality.241  This presumption is only overcome by total 
cognitive impairment.242  M’Naghten, as a measure of criminal responsibility 
and not mental disorder, provides a simple test to determine whether the 
presumption is overcome.  But the deific decree doctrine, “by inviting 
jurors to analyze the defendant’s subjective reality within a single 
narrow area . . . robs M’Naghten of the coherence which comes from 
strictly limiting its field of inquiry.”243  The added complexity makes 
M’Naghten impossible to apply.244 
But perhaps the author misinterprets the purpose of M’Naghten.  
Although M’Naghten is a simple test to measure insanity, it is not a test 
to deny its existence when insanity in fact exists.  Although M’Naghten 
is not designed to measure mental disorder, it is, by its own terms, a test 
that finds insanity only when mental disorder exists.  Of necessity, the 
court examines the defendant’s subjective reality when it decides whether 
the defendant suffered from a mental disorder, and if so, whether that 
disorder prevented him from knowing that his or her act was wrong.   
Lord Chief Justice Tindal, who presided at the trial of Daniel 
M’Naghten, and whose opinion to the House of Lords subsequent to that 
trial included the M’Naghten test of insanity, instructed the jurors that if 
Daniel M’Naghten did not “know that he was doing a wrong or wicked 
act[,] . . . that he was violating the laws both of God and man, then he 
would be entitled to a verdict in his favour.”245  To render their verdict, 
Tindal required the jurors to examine M’Naghten’s subjective reality at 
the time he acted.  Neither Lord Chief Justice Tindal, presiding at Daniel 
M’Naghten’s trial, nor the judges who developed the M’Naghten 
 
 239. See People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 140 (Colo. 1992)  In Serravo, the 
prosecution appealed the trial court’s ruling on challenged jury instructions after the jury 
returned an insanity verdict.  Id. at 129.  Although the Colorado Supreme Court found 
error in the instructions, the court concluded that retrial of the defendant would violate 
the double jeopardy clauses of federal and state constitutions.  Id. at 140. 
 240. Hawthorne, supra note 191, at 1768; see generally id. at 1762–68. 
 241. Id. at 1761. 
 242. Id. at 1762. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 1763. 
 245. Daniel M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 719–20 (H.L. 1843) (summarizing 
Lord Chief Justice Tindal’s charge to the jury in the trial of Daniel M’Naghten). 
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insanity test in response to that trial, intended an insanity verdict to be 
limited to situations in which the defendant experiences total cognitive 
impairment.  In responding to the questions posed by the House of 
Lords, Tindal and the M’Naghten judges specifically assumed that the 
questions were intended to deal solely with persons who experienced 
partial delusions only and who were not in other respects insane.246 
At most, the criticism seems inappropriately directed at the deific 
decree doctrine, rather than at the decision of Justice Cardozo, and the 
courts that follow his lead, to equate the word “wrong” in the 
M’Naghten test to “moral” wrong instead of “legal” wrong.247  Cardozo 
merely presented the deific decree as the strongest example to support 
his “moral” wrong interpretation for all cases, not as an exclusive 
exception to a general rule favoring the “legal” wrong interpretation for 
all cases except deific decree cases. 
Acceptance of a “moral” wrong interpretation of “wrong,” however, 
does not so broaden the test of insanity as to make M’Naghten 
unworkable.  As the California Supreme Court recently observed: 
[M]orality . . . is . . . not simply the individual’s belief in what conduct is or is 
not good.  While it need not reflect the principles of a recognized religion and 
does not demand belief in a God or other supreme being, it does require a 
sincerely held belief grounded in generally accepted ethical or moral principles 
derived from an external source.248 
Because the inquiry into the defendant’s sanity considers the defendant’s 
ability to perceive that his or her act was wrongful, that is, to perceive 
 
 246. Id. at 722. 
 247. Although a few courts have construed the word “wrong” to mean “legal 
wrong,” most have adopted the “moral wrong” interpretation.  See, e.g., People v. 
Skinner, 704 P.2d 752, 760–64 (Cal. 1985) (adopting “moral wrong” interpretation, and 
citing cases from other jurisdictions that adopt the “moral wrong” interpretation); 
People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 133–40 (Colo. 1992) (adopting “moral wrong” 
interpretation, and citing cases from some jurisdictions that adopt the “legal wrong” 
interpretation and cases from other jurisdictions that adopt the “moral wrong” 
interpretation); State v. Wilson, 700 A.2d 633, 636–43 (Conn. 1997) (adopting “moral 
wrong” in its interpretation of the cognitive prong of the ALI insanity test, and citing 
cases from other jurisdictions that adopt the “moral wrong” interpretation in 
construing their M’Naghten insanity test); State v. Worlock, 569 A.2d 1314, 1320–22 
(N.J. 1990) (adopting “moral wrong” interpretation).  In Ivery v. State, 686 So. 2d 495, 
501 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996), the court noted that “an acute minority” of jurisdictions 
interpret “wrongfulness” to mean both “moral and legal wrongfulness.”  But see Laney 
v. State, 486 So. 2d 1242, 1246 (Miss. 1986) (adopting, without extensive discussion, the 
“legal wrong” interpretation). 
 248. People v. Coddington, 2 P.3d 1081, 1144 (Cal. 2000), overruled by Price v. 
Superior Court, 25 P.3d 618 (Cal. 2001) (overruled on different grounds). 
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whether the act would be condemned or condoned by society, courts 
applying the “moral wrong” standard measure morality by societal 
standards, not the defendant’s personal standard.249  If the defendant 
knew that the act was contrary to society’s moral standards, the 
defendant will not be found insane even if the act was not wrongful 
according to the defendant’s personal moral code250 or even if the 
defendant believed, in the words of Cardozo, “that some supposed 
grievance or injury will be redressed, or some public benefit attained.”251  
A terrorist, knowing that murder is not acceptable to the society he seeks 
to influence, can not escape criminal responsibility by proving that his 
action was motivated by a sincere belief that his political cause justified 
his conduct.252 
But what if the defendant acts, not merely out of a personal moral 
code, but out of religious conviction?  Can deific decree cases be 
appropriately distinguished from other cases of religiously inspired 
action?  A Washington Supreme Court justice, dissenting in a deific 
decree case, questioned whether a defendant should be absolved from 
criminal responsibility if God directly commands him or her, but be held 
criminally responsible if he or she merely interprets his or her religious 
beliefs to require the act.253  That, however, is exactly what the deific 
decree doctrine seeks to do.  It does so because it assumes the defendant 
who heard the command is suffering from a delusion that so clouds his 
or her judgment that he or she believes that committing the crime is the 
morally correct thing to do.  This defendant has a mental disorder that 
makes him or her unable to distinguish right from wrong—even 
society’s concept of “wrong.” 
In contrast, the defendant who simply responds to deeply held 
religious beliefs is not delusional.  Although his or her religious beliefs 
may be as strong as those of the defendant who responds to a deific 
decree, this defendant cannot claim that mental disorder negates the 
 
 249. State v. Worlock, 569 A.2d at 1321–22; see also State v. Wilson, 700 A.2d at 
643 (construing the cognitive prong of the ALI insanity test, and holding that the jury 
should be instructed that a defendant does not appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct 
if, at the time he acted, “he did not have the substantial capacity to appreciate that his 
actions were contrary to societal morality, even though he may have been aware that the 
conduct in question was criminal”). 
 250. See, e.g., People v. Coddington, 2 P.3d at 1144; State v.Wilson, 700 A.2d at 
643; State v. Worlock, 569 A.2d at 1322. 
 251. People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945, 948 (N.Y. 1915); see also People v. Serravo, 
823 P.2d at 136 (stating that defendant’s belief “that either personal or public good will 
result” does not constitute insanity if defendant knows the act is morally wrong). 
 252. As Justice Cardozo stated: “The anarchist is not at liberty to break the law 
because he reasons that all government is wrong.”  People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 950. 
 253. State v. Cameron, 674 P.2d 650, 659 (Wash. 1983) (Dimmick, J., dissenting). 
Two other justices concurred in Justice Dimmick’s dissent.  Id. 
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criminality of his or her behavior.  Despite the moral obligation of the 
person’s religious beliefs, society appropriately holds this defendant 
legally accountable for actions that it has prohibited.  Cardozo gives the 
example of a devotee of a religious cult that practices polygamy or 
human sacrifice.  Such a person is criminally responsible, Cardozo tells 
us, not because the belief is false according to society’s majority, but 
rather, because the belief is not the product of a mental disorder.254 
Cardozo cites, and relies in part on, Judge Cox’s charge to the jury in 
Guiteau’s Case, thirty-three years earlier.  Judge Cox attempted to distinguish 
insane delusions from social, political, and religious beliefs.  Insane 
delusions do not result from reasoning and reflection; social, political, 
and religious beliefs do.  He noted that some religious opinions—citing 
the belief in animal magnetism and spiritualism as examples—are “absurd 
in the extreme.”255  They may result from poor reasoning, ignorance, 
fraud, or “perverted moral sentiments.”256  Nevertheless, these opinions 
are founded on some evidence and are subject to change by other external 
evidence or sounder reasoning.  Such evidence or reasoning, however, 
will not dispell a delusion.257 
People may be inspired to do an act by either a sane religious belief or 
an insane delusion.  Judge Cox noted that many Christians believe “that 
they themselves receive special providential guidance and illumination 
in reference to both their inward thoughts and outward actions, and, in 
an undefined sense, are inspired to pursue a certain course of action; but 
this is a mere sane belief, whether well or ill founded.”258  If, however, a 
man sincerely believed he heard God’s voice commanding him to act in 
a way that was contrary to his previous moral and mental convictions, 
this belief would be an “imaginary inspiration amounting to an insane 
delusion.”259  Although Judge Cox clearly distinguishes “sane” religious 
beliefs from “insane” delusions, his example fails to explain why the 
deific decree belief is appropriately declared delusional.  At best, he 
suggests that the sudden change in the defendant’s beliefs justifies a 
 
 254. People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. at 950; see supra text accompanying notes 127–
32 (discussing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–68 (1878), in which the 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting polygamy and 
affirmed the criminal conviction of a Mormon who engaged in polygamy). 
 255. Guiteau’s Case, 10 F. 161, 171 (C.C.D.C. 1882). 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 177. 
 259. Id. 
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conclusion that mental disorder is the precipitating cause, not true 
religious revelation. 
Recent cases do not discuss this issue.260  Rather, courts rely upon 
testimony of psychiatrists and psychologists to establish whether the 
defendant was experiencing an insane delusion at the time the alleged 
deific decree was heard.261  Often, when these experts conclude that no 
delusion existed, courts characterize the defendant’s belief, not as a true 
religious belief, but as a personal moral belief or personal moral code.262  
And personal moral beliefs, just as political beliefs, do not warrant 
exculpation.263 
 
 260. In fact, research reveals only one case decided in the last twenty years in which 
the court attempted to distinguish a defendant’s clearly identified religious belief from a 
deific decree delusional belief.  In State v. Crenshaw, 659 P.2d 488 (Wash. 1983), the 
defendant, who professed to follow the Moscovite religion, believed he was under a duty 
to kill his wife if she committed adultery.  Id. at 491.  He was convicted of first degree 
murder for stabbing his wife twenty-four times with a knife and decapitating her with an 
ax.  Id. at 490.  Despite the defendant’s history of mental disorder that was serious 
enough to require hospitalization, id. at 491, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the 
conviction, finding that the defendant failed to prove that his alleged delusions stemmed 
from a mental disorder, id. at 495.  Because the defendant did not claim to have acted in 
response to a deific command, the court simply equated the defendant’s religious beliefs 
to the beliefs of devotees of religious cults who practice human sacrifice.  Id. at 494. 
 261. In nine of the ten cases cited in footnote 236, supra, in which appellate courts 
considered and applied the deific decree doctrine, the courts specifically discussed, and 
relied upon, testimony of psychiatrists and psychologists to determine whether the 
defendant was delusional at the time he or she acted.  In Galloway v. State, 698 P.2d 940 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1985), the court specifically held that the defense attorney’s failure to 
introduce expert and lay evidence that the defendant acted in response to a deific decree 
delusion and was therefore insane denied the defendant effective assistance of counsel.  
Id. at 941–42. 
In eight of the nine cases cited in footnote 238, supra, in which appellate courts 
considered criminal behavior inspired by nondeific decree delusions or nondelusional, 
but religiously motivated conduct, the courts specifically discussed, and relied upon, 
testimony of psychiatrists and psychologists to determine whether the defendant was 
delusional at the time he or she acted. 
 262. See, e.g., People v. Coddington, 2 P.3d 1081, 1144 (Cal. 2000), overruled by 
Price v. Superior Court, 25 P.3d 618 (Cal. 2001) (overruled on different grounds) 
(affirming murder conviction of defendant who “had rejected the Judeo-Christian 
concept of God, had examined other religions, and ultimately evolved his own concept 
of God as a force running through the universe”); People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 138 
(Colo. 1992) (stating that “[a] personal and subjective standard of morality should not be 
permitted to exonerate a defendant”); State v. Worlock, 569 A.2d 1314, 1324 (N.J. 1990) 
(stating that a “[b]elief in an idiosyncratic code of morality does not constitute the 
defense of criminal insanity”); People v. Wood, 187 N.E.2d 116, 122 (N.Y. 1962) 
(finding that the jury could reasonably have found that defendant, who believed he was 
“God’s emissary” and was charged with killing those whom he believed to be 
degenerates, “was operating under a standard of morality he had set up for himself and 
which applied only to him”).  
 263. See supra text accompanying notes 249–52; see also supra text accompanying 
notes 62–66 (discussing Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 342–44 (1970), in which 
the Supreme Court distinguished religious beliefs from a personal moral code). 
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The deific decree doctrine has been criticized as incoherent.264  If a 
defendant can be found insane for responding to the irresistible 
command of God, then isn’t any defendant who responds to an 
irresistible command delusion from whatever source, be it the Devil, an 
extraterrestrial being, or other force, equally insane?  If a deific decree is 
appropriately construed not as a religious belief but as a delusion, then 
isn’t God’s moral authority to command a person to take the life of 
another irrelevant to the question of whether the defendant was insane at 
the time he or she acted?  By this analysis, all command delusions are 
created equal. 
But deific decree delusions may be rightly distinguished from other 
command delusions, not because God actually has greater moral 
authority to decide who shall live and who shall die, but because the 
person who believes in God lacks any basis to refuse God’s command.  
It is not God’s unlimited power to inflict punishment for disobedience, 
however, that distinguishes a deific decree delusion from other 
command delusions.  After all, to the delusional defendant, the perceived 
power of the Devil, an extraterrestrial being, or other force may seem 
equally compelling.  Under a properly applied M’Naghten test, however, 
the finding of insanity depends upon whether the defendant knew his or 
her conduct was wrong—a question of cognitive impairment—not upon 
whether the defendant’s free will was overcome by an irresistible 
impulse or other inability to control his or her behavior—a question of 
volitional impairment.  Under M’Naghten, the defendant’s fear of God’s 
all-mighty power does not free him or her from adhering to society’s 
laws.  Rather, it is the defendant’s inability to discern that a righteous 
and all-knowing God—the source of all truth and moral judgment—has 
not spoken to him or her and commanded that the defendant kill another. 
This distinction—between God as all-powerful and God as the source 
of all truth—may explain why Chief Justice Shaw declared in Rogers 
that a defendant who acts in response to a deific decree delusion “acts 
under the delusive but sincere belief that what he is doing is by the 
command of a superior power, which supersedes all human laws, and the 
laws of nature.”265  The defendant’s belief in God’s power to make the 
moral judgment, not the defendant’s belief in God’s power to inflict 
punishment on a disobeying defendant, warrants the insanity finding.  As 
 
 264. Hawthorne, supra note 191, at 1775. 
 265. Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500, 503 (1844). 
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Judge Cox instructed the Guiteau jury: “If a man insanely believes that 
he has a command from the Almighty to kill, it is difficult to understand 
how such a man can know that it is wrong for him to do it.”266  The 
defendant, acting under a deific decree, does not know that society will 
condemn the act as immoral.  A delusional defendant who hears a 
command delusion from some other source can be far less certain that 
society will condone the act.  Cardozo tied deific decree delusions to 
M’Naghten’s cognitive focus by declaring that if a mother “is inspired 
by an insane delusion that God had appeared to her and ordained the 
sacrifice [of her infant child,] [i]t seems a mockery to say that, within the 
meaning of the statute, she knows that the act is wrong.”267 
Recent cases apply the same analysis.  The Supreme Court of 
Connecticut observed: 
[W]e are hard pressed to envision an individual who, because of mental disease 
or defect, truly believes that a divine power has authorized his actions, but, at 
the same time, also truly believes that such actions are immoral.  An individual 
laboring under a delusion that causes him to believe in the divine approbation of 
his conduct is an individual who, in all practicality, is unlikely to be able fully 
to appreciate the wrongfulness of that conduct.268 
The Colorado Supreme Court described a deific decree delusion as one 
“that virtually destroys the cognitive ability to distinguish the morality 
or immorality of an act, even though the person may be aware the act is 
contrary to law.”269 
The deific decree doctrine is not an exception to the M’Naghten test.  
The deific decree doctrine is not even a separate doctrine.270  Justice 
Cardozo never claimed that it was.  Neither did Judge Cox nor Chief 
Justice Shaw.  Rather, a deific decree is merely a factual circumstance in 
which the law is willing to assume that the delusional, but sincerely 
believing, defendant responded to God’s command because he or she did 
not know the act was wrong.  The law is unwilling to make a similar 
assumption when a delusional defendant responds to other command 
hallucinations.  In the deific decree situation, the prosecutor may offer 
 
 266. Guiteau’s Case, 10 F. 161, 182 (C.C.D.C. 1882).  Judge Cox also instructed 
the jury that a defendant who acts under a deific decree is “incapable of seeing that it 
was a wrong thing to do.”  Id. at 186. 
 267. People v. Schmidt, 110 N.E. 945, 949 (N.Y. 1915). 
 268. State v. Wilson, 700 A.2d 633, 641 (Conn. 1997) (applying the cognitive 
prong of the ALI insanity test). 
 269. People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 136 (Colo. 1992) (applying the M’Naghten 
insanity test); see also State v. Potter, 842 P.2d 481, 489 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (holding 
that defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction allowing a finding of insanity if 
defendant, acting under a deific decree, had “cognitive ability” to distinguish right from 
wrong “but lacked volitional control”). 
 270. Christopher Hawthorne, a critic of the deific decree doctrine, declares it to be a 
“pseudo-doctrine.”  See generally Hawthorne, supra note 191, at 1774–79. 
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evidence to establish that the defendant knew his or her act was wrong.  
In a nondeific command delusion situation, the defense may offer 
evidence that the defendant did not know his or her act was wrong.  In 
either situation, the jury decides whether the defendant possessed or 
lacked such knowledge. 
The deific decree doctrine can be subjected to one more criticism—
one that to the best of our knowledge has not yet been suggested.  The 
deific decree doctrine assumes that when the defendant heard the voice 
of God commanding him or her to kill, the defendant was experiencing a 
delusion—that he or she was not experiencing a true religious revelation.  
The critics of the deific decree doctrine also make the same assumption.  
But is that assumption warranted?  Part III.C challenged that assumption, 
using Supreme Court decisions interpreting the meaning of religious 
belief.271  Part V challenges that assumption by examining the psychiatric 
definition of delusion. 
V.  DEFINING DELUSION 
A.  Nineteenth Century Definition 
Throughout history, delusional thought has been considered the very 
essence of insanity.272  And just as our society today defines insanity in 
much the same way society defined insanity in the mid-nineteenth 
century,273 psychiatrists today define delusion in much the same way 
they defined delusion in the mid-nineteenth century.274  In 1856, only a 
few years after the M’Naghten decision, John Charles Bucknill, M.D.,275 
 
 271. See supra text accompanying notes 96–124. 
 272. For example, in the celebrated trial of James Hadfield for shooting at (but 
missing) King George III, Thomas Erskine, who represented the defendant, asserted: 
“Delusion, . . . where there is no frenzy or raving madness, is the true character of 
insanity.”  The Trial of James Hadfield (K.B. 1800), in 27 T.B. HOWELL, A COMPLETE 
COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 1281, 1314 (1820). 
 273. See supra text accompanying notes 172–91 (discussing M’Naghten and other 
tests of insanity, and the reascendance of M’Naghten following the trial of John 
Hinckley). 
 274. For an excellent discussion of the meaning of delusions and the various ways 
they are categorized today, see generally ANDREW SIMS, SYMPTOMS IN THE MIND: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 101–32 (2d ed. 1995). 
 275. Dr. Bucknill was “Licentiate of the Royal College of Physicians, Fellow of 
University College, and Fellow of the Royal Medical and Chirurgical Society, London, 
and physician to the Devon County Lunatic Asylum.”  JOHN CHARLES BUCKNILL, 
UNSOUNDNESS OF MIND IN RELATION TO CRIMINAL ACTS title page of original edition 
(1856), reprinted in INSANITY AND THE LAW—TWO NINETEENTH CENTURY CLASSICS 
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wrote Unsoundness of Mind in Relation to Criminal Acts, an award-
winning essay.276  “In common parlance,” Dr. Bucknill explained, “a 
delusion is either a deception or an error of opinion.”277  The tricks of a 
magician delude or deceive their viewers.  If a person believes the trick 
is real, the person could also be viewed as deluded in that he or she is 
mistaken or has made an error of opinion.278  If popular opinion 
determines what constitutes a delusion, then “[t]he worship of Buddha, or 
of Vishnu, and other false religions”279 could be characterized as 
delusions. 
Such conventional understanding of delusion is far too broad for 
medico-legal purposes.  According to Dr. Bucknill, delusions are limited 
to intellectual errors that immediately affect a person’s judgment.280  
They do not include false perceptions of the senses, for sensations do not 
exist only in the imagination of the individual.281  Delusions refer to “an 
operation of the mind peculiar to insane persons.”282  Dr. Bucknill 
suggested the following definition: “A delusion is a belief in the 
existence of things which have no existence in reality, or an erroneous 
perception of the nature of things, or of their relation to each other, 
occasioned by cerebromental disease.”283  He acknowledged, however, 
that “there is no certain method of distinguishing between the erroneous 
intellectual operations of a diseased mind, and those of the sane but 
imperfect reasoners who abound in society.”284 
Judge Cox, in instructing the Guiteau jury twenty-six years later, used 
similar language to define delusion: “[T]he insane delusion, according to 
all testimony, seems to be an unreasoning and incorrigible belief in the 
existence of facts which are either impossible absolutely, or, at least, 
impossible under the circumstances of the individual.”285  As examples 
of delusions, Judge Cox mentioned a belief, with no reason to support it, 
that someone is attempting to kill the person, or that the person possesses 




 276. The King and Queen’s College of Physicians in Ireland awarded Dr. Bucknill 
the Sugden Prize for his essay.  Id. 
 277. Id. at 33. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. at 34. 
 280. Id. at 33. 
 281. Id. at 34; see infra note 345, discussing the distinction between delusions and 
hallucinations. 
 282. BUCKNILL, supra note 275, at 34. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Guiteau’s Case, 10 F. 161, 170 (C.C.D.C. 1882). 
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that [the person] has invented something which will revolutionize the world, or 
that [the person] is president of the United States, or . . . God, or Christ, or that 
[the person] is dead, or . . . immortal, or . . . has a glass arm, or . . . is pursued by 
enemies, or that [the person] is inspired by God to do something.286 
In each of Judge Cox’s examples, except the last, the person’s belief 
can be proven to be false.  But a belief that God spoke and commanded 
the person to do an act cannot.  Because such belief cannot be proven to 
be false, we question the appropriateness of including the deific decree 
example as a delusion.  Judge Cox’s attempt to characterize a deific decree 
as a delusion demonstrates the difficulty of distinguishing delusions from 
rational, but potentially erroneous, ideas.  Dr. Bucknill appropriately 
cautioned that no certain method exists to distinguish between them.287 
Judge Cox explained that the “inspired by God” example is “a case of 
imaginary inspiration amounting to an insane delusion” if the person acts 
“in reversal of his whole previous moral bent and mental convictions.”288  
His analysis is not persuasive.289  If God really did speak to a person and 
commanded that he or she perform some act, that person is very likely to 
think and act entirely differently than he or she did before the revelation. 
This would be true even if the person did not believe in any particular 
religion or even in God prior to that event.  It would also be true even if 
the person disavowed the religious nature of the belief some time later, 
claiming that he or she now acknowledges that it was a delusion, and 
that he or she should be found insane.  The insanity defense focuses on 
the defendant’s knowledge of right and wrong at the time he or she acted 
unlawfully, not at the time of trial when the defendant seeks to avoid 
criminal responsibility by claiming that he or she was beguiled by 
delusion at the time of the act. 
Perhaps Judge Cox’s decision to treat a deific decree as a delusion and 
not as a religious belief was influenced by Dr. Bucknill’s suggested 
method for diagnosing delusions.  Just as a physician considers fever as 
one symptom of, but not determinative of, pneumonia, so too a physician 
considers an absurd belief as one symptom of, but not determinative of, 
insanity.  To have diagnostic value, the belief must be considered together 
 
 286. Id. at 170–71; see supra text accompanying notes 255–59 (discussing Judge 
Cox’s attempt to distinguish insane delusions from social, political, and religious 
beliefs). 
 287. See supra text accompanying note 284. 
 288. Guiteau’s Case, 10 F. at 177. 
 289. See supra text accompanying note 259. 
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with other symptoms.290  For example, Dr. Bucknill asserted that a belief 
in parricide, “when taken in connection with sudden change of habits 
and disposition; with bodily indisposition, loss of rest, and other 
indications of nervous disturbance; and followed by the homicide of a 
beloved parent, that strange opinion is at once recognized as the fantasy 
of a diseased brain.”291 
Judge Cox informed the jury that a delusion is a firmly held but false 
belief that is out of character for the individual.  Specifically, Judge Cox 
told the jury: 
There are cases in which a man’s mental faculties generally seem to be in full 
vigor, but on some one subject he seems to be deranged.  He is possessed, 
perhaps, with a belief which every one recognizes as absurd, which he has not 
reasoned himself into, and cannot be reasoned out of, which we call an insane 
delusion, or he has, in addition, some morbid propensity, seemingly in harsh 
discord with the rest of his intellectual and moral nature.292 
A belief in parricide, however, can be distinguished from a belief that 
God commanded a person to kill.  A deific decree qualifies as a religious 
belief.293  Although society may wish to characterize the deific decree belief 
as absurd or false, it cannot, consistent with our Constitution, do so. 
B.  The DSM 
Today, mental disorders are identified and classified in two definitive 
works.  The first, used by psychiatrists throughout the world—but not 
generally used in the United States—is the International Classification 
of Diseases (ICD), published by the World Health Organization, and 
now in its tenth revision.294  Although the ICD identifies persistent 
delusional disorders as mental disorders, and uses the word “delusion” in 
defining such disorders, it does not define the word “delusion.”295  The 
 
 290. BUCKNILL, supra note 275, at 34. 
 291. Id. at 34–35. 
 292. Guiteau’s Case, 10 F. at 166. 
 293. See supra discussion accompanying notes 96–124. 
 294. WORLD HEALTH ORG., INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL CLASSIFICATION OF 
DISEASES AND RELATED HEALTH PROBLEMS: TENTH REVISION (ICD-10) (1992).  
Currently, in the United States, psychiatrists use the ICD-9-CM, which is the ninth 
revision, clinical modification of the ICD.  Before ICD-10 can be implemented in the 
United States, it must be converted into “American” english and approved by various 
private and governmental organizations.  WORLD HEALTH ORG., INTERNATIONAL 
CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES, NINTH REVISION, CLINICAL MODIFICATION 19 (5th ed. 
1998). 
 295. Andrew Sims, Delusional Syndromes in ICD-10, 159 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 46,  
Nov. 1991, at 47.  Sims discusses the various psychiatric diagnoses described in ICD-10 
that list delusions as a symptom.  See also WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE ICD-10 
CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL AND BEHAVIOURAL DISORDERS: CLINICAL DESCRIPTIONS AND 
DIAGNOSTIC GUIDELINES 97–98 (1992). 
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second, used by psychiatrists296 in the United States, is the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), published by the 
American Psychiatric Association, and now in its fourth edition.297  The 
DSM is often referred to as “the psychiatric profession’s diagnostic 
Bible.”298 
This “Bible,” however, is not infallible.  In fact, even the drafters of 
this manual of mental disorders question the distinction between 
“mental” disorders and “physical” disorders, calling it “a reductionistic 
anachronism of mind/body dualism.”299  The term “mental disorders” 
continues to be used, they admit, because no appropriate substitute has 
been found.300  More importantly, in the fourth edition of the DSM 
(DSM-IV), the drafters acknowledge: “[A]lthough this manual provides a 
classification of mental disorders, it must be admitted that no definition 
adequately specifies precise boundaries for the concept of ‘mental 
disorder.’  The concept of mental disorder . . . lacks a consistent 
operational definition that covers all situations.”301  Although various 
concepts have been used to define mental disorder, “none is equivalent 
to the concept, and different situations call for different definitions.”302  
The drafters expressed their particular concern that use of DSM-IV for 
forensic purposes poses “significant risks that diagnostic information 
will be misused or misunderstood.”303  Although “DSM-IV is a 
categorical classification that divides mental disorders into types based 
on criteria sets with defining features[,] . . . there is no assumption that 
each category of mental disorder is a completely discrete entity with 
 
 296. Although we refer to psychiatrists in this Article, we note that psychologists 
also use the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders as the definitive 
authority for diagnosing mental disorders. 
 297. DSM-IV, supra note 14.  The first edition of the DSM was published in 1952.  
Subsequent revisions were published in 1968 (DSM-II), 1980 (DSM-III), 1987 (DSM-III-
R), 1994 (DSM-IV) and 2000 (DSM-IV-TR). 
 298. United States v. Harris, No. S192 Cr. 455, 1994 WL 683429, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 6, 1994) (quoting an article in N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1994); see also Mancuso v. 
Consol. Edison Co., 967 F. Supp. 1437, 1454 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing Harris, 1994 WL 
683429, at *4, and mentioning testimony that the DSM is the “standard manual used to 
make diagnoses by psychologists”); State v. Hoskins, 14 P.3d 997, 1019 (Ariz. 2000) 
(describing DSM-IV as “the Bible of psychiatrists and psychologists”); Ogden v. J.K.M, 
557 N.W.2d 229, 234 (N.D. 1996) (Sandstrom, J., dissenting) (describing testimony of a 
psychiatrist characterizing DSM-IV as the Bible). 
 299. DSM-IV, supra note 14, at xxi. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. at xxiii. 
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absolute boundaries dividing it from other mental disorders or from no 
mental disorder.”304 
DSM-IV has no underlying theoretical basis.305  The diagnoses, other 
than mental disorders induced by substances or medical conditions, do 
not carry any implications about the causes of the disorders.  A condition 
may be classified as a disorder without any knowledge of the etiology of 
the disorder.306  DSM-IV simply offers pragmatic descriptions of the 
conditions it characterizes as mental disorders.307  And how were these 
descriptions derived?  In evaluating proposals to define or modify taxonomy, 
drafters relied upon “expert opinion, rather than laboratory test, as the 
‘gold standard.’”308  Members of the work groups who developed the 
diagnoses “were instructed that they were to participate as consensus 
scholars and not as advocates of previously held views.”309  In the effort 
to achieve consensus, political compromise, rather than rigorous scientific 
research, was necessary.310 
Neither is this “Bible” immutable.  The drafters of DSM-IV acknowledge 
that the consensus about classification existed at the time the manual 
was first published and that “[n]ew knowledge generated by research or 
clinical experience will undoubtedly lead to an increased understanding 
of the disorders included in DSM-IV, to the identification of new 
disorders, and to the removal of some disorders in future classifications.”311  
 
 304. Id. at xxii. 
 305. DAVID MECHANIC, MENTAL HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 22 (4th ed. 1999).  
Although some might view the absence of a theoretical basis as a weakness, the drafters 
of DSM-IV deliberately chose not to identify with any specific theory of mental disorder, 
thus avoiding conflicts between adherents of various psychiatric schools of thought. 
 306. DSM-IV, supra note 14, at xxi. 
 307. MECHANIC, supra note 305, at 22.  Allen Frances, M.D., who chaired the Task 
Force on DSM-IV and who co-authored a guidebook to aid clinicians in using DSM-IV, 
wrote: 
The DSM “mental disorders” are best understood as descriptive syndromes 
likely to assist in our increased understanding of the underlying disease, but 
only in selected cases do they, as currently defined, actually represent such 
diseases. . . . [I]t is to be hoped fervently that the descriptive system of 
diagnosis will gradually yield to categorization that is based on a more 
fundamental understanding of the pathogenesis of mental disorders. 
ALLEN FRANCES ET AL., DSM-IV GUIDEBOOK 17 (1995). 
 308. Gretchen L. Haas et al., Dr. Haas and Associates Reply, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
995 (1993) (letter to the editor). 
 309. DSM-IV, supra note 14, at xv. 
 310. MECHANIC, supra note 305, at 22.  In discussing the controversy about how 
neuroses should be dealt with in DSM-III, Robert L. Spitzer, M.D., who chaired the Task 
Force on Nomenclature and Statistics, and a colleague, reported: “The entire process of 
achieving a settlement seemed more appropriate to the encounter of political rivals than 
to the orderly pursuit of scientific knowledge.”  Ronald Bayer & Robert L. Spitzer, 
Neurosis, Psychodynamics, and DSM-III: A History of the Controversy, 42 ARCHIVES 
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 187, 195 (1985). 
 311. DSM-IV, supra note 14, at xxiii. 
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A new text revision of the diagnostic manual (DSM-IV-TR) was 
published in 2000.312 
Despite its deficiencies and limitations, despite its “work-in-progress” 
status, the DSM is the psychiatric profession’s official nomenclature for 
defining mental disorder in the United States.313  Nothing exists—or is 
likely to come into existence—to compete with it.  DSM’s rise to 
prominence began in 1980 with the publication of the third edition 
(DSM-III).  “DSM-III introduced a number of important methodological 
innovations, including explicit diagnostic criteria, a multiaxial system, 
and a descriptive approach that attempted to be neutral with respect to 
theories of etiology.”314  Explicit diagnostic criteria were constructed 
and validated through extensive empirical research.315  In contrast, DSM-
IIIR, published in 1987, and DSM-IV, published in 1994, were far more 
modest in innovation and in impact.  In essence, both merely fine-tuned 
DSM-III, correcting errors and eliminating inconsistencies.  Both remain 
close to DSM-III in content and definitions.316  In fact, work on DSM-IV 
was undertaken not because a further revision of DSM was needed, but 
because the American Psychiatric Association sought to coordinate 
coding systems with the tenth edition of the World Health Organization’s 
ICD (ICD-10), which was in the process of development.317 
C.  The DSM-IV Definition of Delusion and Its Critique 
Appendix C to DSM-IV contains a Glossary of Technical Terms.318  
Of the seventy-four terms in that Glossary, more space is devoted to 
explaining “delusion” than is devoted to any other term.319  The first 
 
 312. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS, TEXT REVISION (DSM-IV-TR) (4th ed. 2000).  Because this Article 
was written before DSM-IV-TR was published, and because DSM-IV-TR did not alter the 
DSM-IV definition of “delusion,” id. at 821–22, or “bizarre delusion,” id. at 821, as those 
terms apply to the diagnoses of schizophrenia, id. at 297–313, or delusional disorder, id. 
at 323–28, this Article continues to refer to DSM-IV. 
 313. DSM-IV, supra note 14, at xv. 
 314. Id. at xvii–xviii. 
 315. Id. at xviii. 
 316. MECHANIC, supra note 305, at 21. 
 317. Id.; see also DSM-IV, supra note 14, at xxi (asserting that drafters of ICD-10 
and DSM-IV “worked closely to coordinate their efforts, resulting in much mutual 
influence”). 
 318. DSM-IV, supra note 14, app. C at 763–71. 
 319. The Glossary devotes thirty-eight lines to explaining “delusion,” id. at 765–66, 
and thirty-five lines to explaining “hallucination,” id. at 767.  The third longest 
explanation is for “psychotic,” which receives only fourteen lines.  Id. at 770. 
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sentence is an affirmative statement about what a delusion is: “A false 
belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly 
sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what 
constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary.”320  
The second sentence is a negative statement about what a delusion is 
not: “The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the 
person’s culture or subculture (e.g., it is not an article of religious faith).”321  
Taken together, these two sentences constitute the definition of delusion, 
as they establish the conditions required to diagnose a delusion. 
The third sentence discusses a subcategory of false beliefs, one that 
involves value judgments.  For example, a person who asserts: “I am the 
most brilliant law professor (or psychiatrist) in the world,” is making a 
value judgment.  Such beliefs are declared to be delusions “only when 
the judgment is so extreme as to defy credibility.”322  The final sentence 
of the first paragraph is commentary, cautioning the reader that “[i]t is 
often difficult to distinguish between a delusion and an overvalued 
idea.”323  An overvalued idea is described as an unreasonable belief or 
idea, but one the individual does not hold as firmly as the false belief 
held by the delusional individual. 
The second paragraph contains descriptions of twelve common types 
of delusions, subdivided according to content.  Among them are: bizarre 
delusions, grandiose delusions, persecutory delusions, somatic delusions, 
thought broadcasting, and thought insertion.324  Noticeably absent from 
this list are religious “delusions.”  The DSM-IV definition of delusion 
(the first two sentences of the Glossary explanation) is virtually 
identical325 to the DSM-III definition,326 published in 1980, and to the 
 
 320. Id. at 765.  Actually, the first “sentence” is actually a sentence fragment, 
containing no subject or verb. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. at 765–66. 
 325. Both DSM-III and DSM-III-R begin their definitions of delusion with the 
phrase: “A false personal belief.”  The only change made in the DSM-IV definition was 
to eliminate the word “personal.”  Manfred Spitzer, M.D., Ph.D., challenged the use of 
the adjective “personal” as it appeared in DSM-III-R.  Although the word “implies that 
the very belief in question is not shared by others and has somehow strange features,” 
Dr. Spitzer noted that “in the case of shared delusions, the belief may in fact not be held 
by just one person and thus may not be personal; however, the content in question is 
likely to be rather idiosyncratic.”  Manfred Spitzer, On Defining Delusions, 31 
COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 377, 379 (1990) [hereinafter Manfred Spitzer].  Because 
DSM-III-R was being revised at the time Dr. Spitzer’s critique was published, the 
American Psychiatric Association may have decided to delete the word “personal” in the 
DSM-IV definition in response to Dr. Spitzer’s argument. 
 326. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-III) app. B at 356 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-III]. 
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DSM-III-R definition,327 published in 1987. 
The DSM definition appears to be a logical refinement of Judge Cox’s 
nineteenth century definition.  Instead of “an unreasoning and incorrigible 
belief in the existence of facts which are either impossible absolutely, or, 
at least, impossible under the circumstances of the individual,”328 as 
Judge Cox informed the Guiteau jury, a delusion is now defined as  “[a] 
false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is 
firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and despite 
what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the 
contrary.”329 
Despite this historical harmony and interprofessional congruency, the 
definition of delusion is far from settled.  One critic declared that 
delusion “has defied unambiguous definition.”330  A second explained 
why, despite the facade created by an accepted definition, no acceptable 
definition exists: 
Most attempted definitions begin with “false belief,” and this is swiftly 
amended to an unfounded belief to counter the circumstance where a person’s 
belief turns out to be true.  Then caveats accumulate concerning the person’s 
culture and whether the beliefs are shared.  Religious beliefs begin to cause 
problems here and religious delusions begin to create major conflicts.  The 
beleaguered psychopathologist then falls back on the “quality” of the belief—
the strength of the conviction in the face of contradictory evidence, the 
“incorrigibility,” the personal commitment, etc.  Here, the irrationality seen in 
“normal” reasoning undermines the specificity of these characteristics for 
delusions as does the variable conviction and fluctuating insight seen in patients 
with chronic psychoses who everyone agrees are deluded.  Finally we have the 
add-ons: the distress caused by the belief, its preoccupying quality, and its 
maladaptiveness generally, again sometimes equally applicable to other beliefs 
held by non-psychotic fanatics of one sort or another.  In the end we are left 
with a shambles.331 
 
 327. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS, REVISED (DSM-III-R) app. C at 395 (3d ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter 
DSM-III-R]. 
 328. Guiteau’s Case, 10 F. 161, 170 (C.C.D.C. 1882); see supra discussion 
accompanying notes 285–86. 
 329. DSM-IV, supra note 14, app. C at 765. 
 330. Edgar Jones, The Phenomenology of Abnormal Belief: A Philosophical and 
Psychiatric Inquiry, 6 PHIL. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 1, 1 (1999), available at 
http://muse.jhu.edu (last visited Aug. 9, 2001). 
 331. Anthony S. David, On the Impossibility of Defining Delusions, 6 PHIL. 
PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 17, 17–18 (1999) (citations omitted), available at 
http://muse.jhu.edu (last visited Aug. 9, 2001).  Dr. David concluded: “Delusions exist in 
a world of values, assumptions, prejudices, incorrect inferences, superstitions, wishful-
thinking, and paranoia (in the non-technical sense).  This is what makes delusions 
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A third critic decried the absence of a scientific approach applied to the 
definition of delusion, declaring: “Despite their importance in a wide 
range of psychiatric disorders, understanding of delusions is markedly 
limited.  Virtually every facet of the subject of delusions remains 
uncharted according to the standards of scientific methodology.”332  
“[W]e remain unclear about precisely what delusions are; and we have 
as yet no means of identifying them with a laboratory test.”333 
Perhaps the most detailed and scholarly criticism of the DSM definition 
was written by eminent psychiatrist Manfred Spitzer, M.D.  Dr. Spitzer’s 
article, On Defining Delusions,334 was published in 1990, at a time when 
DSM-III-R was being revised and DSM-IV was being developed.  He 
parses the definition, demonstrating that it incorporates unproven factual 
assumptions, contains internal inconsistencies, and is both vague and 
ambiguous. 
The very first defining feature of a delusion is its falsity.  And yet, this 
criterion is not applicable to some statements that clinicians identify as 
delusions.  Dr. Spitzer specifically mentions religious delusions as 
examples.  He notes that “religious beliefs are neither true nor false, at 
least in the ‘scientific’ meaning of the words true and false.”335  
Additionally, in many cases, the clinician may be unable to disprove the 
patient’s claim but still wants to identify the patient’s belief as a 
delusion.336  The psychiatrist lacks the resources and expertise to 
disprove a patient’s claim, for example,  that he or she is being followed 
by the CIA or knows that extraterrestrial beings populate the city.  
Finally, on rare occasions, delusions may turn out to be true.  If a man 
delusionally believes his spouse is unfaithful, the belief is no less a 
delusion simply because his delusional jealousy ultimately drives her to 
an act of infidelity.337 
The DSM definition of delusion requires that the “false belief [be] 
based on incorrect inference about external reality.”  Dr. Spitzer notes 
that, to the extent patients draw incorrect inferences, the phenomenon is 
properly described as a formal thought disorder and not a disorder of 
content.338  Additionally, empirical research has not determined the role 
 
possible and also what makes them impossible to pin down.”  Id. at 19. 
 332. Theo C. Manschreck, Pathogenesis of Delusions, 18 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. 
AM. 213, 213 (1995).  Dr. Manschreck added: “Even phenomenology, certainly biologic 
underpinnings but also the role of culture and the psychology of delusions are subjects 
sorely in need of research elaboration.”  Id. 
 333. Id. at 227. 
 334. Manfred Spitzer, supra note 325. 
 335. Id. at 378–79. 
 336. Id. at 379. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. at 379–80. 
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played by incorrect inferences in delusion formation, if indeed, inferences 
play any role at all.  Thus, this criterion depends upon a theory about the 
etiology of delusions that is not warranted and violates DSM’s explicitly 
stated agenda “to describe psychopathology without reference to 
psychological etiological theories.”339 
The DSM definition declares that delusions are “about external reality.”  
But this criterion is inconsistent with what DSM says about delusions in 
describing the symptomatology of schizophrenia.  Examples of delusions 
that are symptoms of schizophrenia include “thought withdrawal,” i.e., 
the belief that the person’s thoughts have been taken away by some 
outside force; “thought insertion,” i.e., the belief that alien thoughts have 
been placed into the person’s mind; and “delusions of control,” i.e., the 
belief that the person’s body or actions are being manipulated by some 
outside force.340  And yet, as Dr. Spitzer points out, these so-called 
delusions describe the individual’s subjective experiences, not his or her 
belief about “external reality.”341 
Finally, Dr. Spitzer asserts that although delusions are regarded as a 
subset of beliefs, that is, false beliefs, such characterization does not add 
anything to the definition and, in fact, may be misleading.  He notes that 
delusional patients typically express conviction and certainty about their 
delusional thoughts, rather than suggest that their thought has been 
subjected to inquiry and discussion.  In other words, delusional patients 
say that they “know that such and such,” rather than that they “think that 
such and such.”  To declare a patient delusional, the psychiatrist must 
determine that the patient’s knowledge claim is merely a belief.  
In short, from the subjective point of view, delusions are not beliefs, and from 
the objective point of view, the notion that delusions are some form of beliefs is 
true by definition but has no empirical meaning, that is to say, does not properly 
reconstruct what happens clinically when delusions are diagnosed.342 
 
 339. Id. at 380. 
 340. Id.  Although Dr. Spitzer quotes directly from DSM-III-R’s discussion of 
schizophrenia, DSM-III-R, supra note 327, at 188, these three phenomena are also 
specifically identified as delusions in DSM-IV’s discussion of schizophrenia.  DSM-IV, 
supra note 14, at 275.  Additionally, DSM-IV’s Glossary definition of “delusion” 
specifically identifies as common types of delusions: thought insertion, delusions of 
being controlled, and thought broadcasting, i.e., the belief “that one’s thoughts are being 
broadcast out loud so that they can be perceived by others.”  Id. app. C at 765–66. 
 341. Manfred Spitzer, supra note 325, at 380. 
 342. Id. at 381–82. 
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D.  The Distinction Between Bizarre and Nonbizarre Delusions 
A delusion is not a mental disorder per se, it is a symptom of a mental 
disorder.  Other criteria must be satisfied before the delusional individual 
can be diagnosed with a mental disorder.  For example, the DSM-IV 
diagnosis for delusional disorder requires, among other criteria, that the 
person have nonbizarre delusions of at least one month’s duration and 
that the criteria for schizophrenia have not been met.343  Nonbizarre 
delusions are characterized as delusions that involve “situations that 
occur in real life, such as being followed, poisoned, infected, loved at a 
distance, or deceived by spouse or lover, or having a disease.”344 
In contrast, a diagnosis of schizophrenia requires two or more of the 
following five symptoms during a one-month period: delusions, 
hallucinations,345 disorganized speech, grossly disorganized or catatonic 
behavior, or negative symptoms such as affective flattening, alogia, or 
avolition.346  If, however, the person is experiencing bizarre delusions, 
only that one symptom is required to meet this diagnostic criterion.347  
The DSM-IV Glossary defines a delusion as bizarre if it “involves a 
phenomenon that the person’s culture would regard as totally implausible.”348  
The DSM-IV discussion of schizophrenia adds: “Delusions are deemed 
bizarre if they are clearly implausible and not understandable and do not 
derive from ordinary life experiences.”349  For example, a person is 
having a bizarre delusion if he or she believes “that a stranger has 
removed his or her internal organs and has replaced them with someone 
 
 343. DSM-IV, supra note 14, at 301. 
 344. Id. 
 345. The DSM-IV Glossary defines “hallucination” as “[a] sensory perception that 
has the compelling sense of reality of a true perception but that occurs without external 
stimulation of the relevant sensory organ.  Hallucinations should be distinguished from 
illusions, in which an actual external stimulus is misperceived or misinterpreted.”  Id. 
app. C at 767.  In 1856, Dr. Bucknill used a similar analysis to distinguish delusions 
from hallucinations.  See supra text accompanying notes 280–81.  Under DSM-IV, if a 
person claims to hear the voice of God telling him to kill, this phenomenon could 
possibly be considered a hallucination, not a delusion. 
 346. DSM-IV, supra note 14, at 285.  The DSM-IV Glossary defines “flat affect” as 
“[a]bsence or near absence of any signs of affective expression,” id. at 763, “alogia” as 
“[a]n impoverishment in thinking that is inferred from observing speech and language 
behavior,” id. at 764, and “avolition” as “[a]n inability to initiate and persist in goal-
directed activities,” id. 
 347. Id. at 285.  The “characteristic symptoms” of schizophrenia, including 
delusions and hallucinations, are identified as Criterion A.  See generally id. at 274–77 
(discussing Criterion A symptoms in greater detail).  For a diagnosis of schizophrenia, 
other criteria have to be satisfied, including “social/occupational dysfunction” (Criterion 
B), “duration” (Criterion C), and “schizoaffective and mood disorder exclusion” 
(Criterion D).  Id. at 285.  See generally id. at 277–78 (discussing Criteria B and C 
symptoms in greater detail). 
 348. Id. app. C at 765. 
 349. Id. at 275. 
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else’s organs without leaving any wounds or scars.”350 
In 1980, when DSM-III was published, both bizarre and nonbizarre 
delusions were listed separately as symptoms of schizophrenia, although 
each was accorded equal weight as a characteristic symptom of that 
disorder.351  In 1987, however, DSM-III-R assigned greater diagnostic 
significance to bizarre delusions, weighing them more heavily than 
nonbizarre delusions.352  In 1994, DSM-IV merely continued this distinction. 
When DSM-III was revised, the definition of bizarre delusion was also 
revised.  In DSM-III, a “bizarre delusion” was defined as “[a] false belief 
whose content is patently absurd and has no possible basis in fact.”353  
Both DSM-III-R354 and DSM-IV
355 define “bizarre delusion” as a false 
belief “that involves a phenomenon that the person’s culture would 
regard as totally implausible.” 
The DSM-IV Sourcebook, published as a five-volume companion to 
DSM-IV, provides a comprehensive record of the clinical and research 
support for the decisions made in drafting DSM-IV.356  According to the 
DSM-IV Sourcebook, the change in language from DSM-III’s “impossible” 
to DSM-III-R’s and DSM-IV’s “implausible” was intended to invoke the 
concept of “nonunderstandability.”357  The change was made in order to 
clarify the definition so to enhance interrater agreement about whether a 
 
 350. Id. 
 351. DSM-III, supra note 326, at 188.  Bizarre delusions were listed first, and 
“somatic, grandiose, religious, nihilistic, or other delusions without persecutory or 
jealous content” were listed second, separately identified as a Criterion A symptom of 
schizophrenia.  Id.  “Delusions with persecutory or jealous content” were listed third, but 
such delusions qualified as a symptom of schizophrenia only “if accompanied by 
hallucinations of any type.”  Id. 
 352. DSM-III-R, supra note 327, at 194. 
 353. DSM-III, supra note 326, app. B at 356.  The DSM-III Glossary definition 
gives an example of a bizarre delusion: “A man believed that when his adenoids had 
been removed in childhood, a box had been inserted into his head, and that wires had 
been placed in his head so that the voice he heard was that of the governor.”  Id. app. B 
at 356–57. 
 354. DSM-III-R, supra note 327, app. C at 395.  Despite the change in Glossary 
definition, DSM-III-R continued to use the same example of a bizarre delusion used in 
the Glossary definition to DSM-III.  Id.; see example discussed supra note 353. 
 355. DSM-IV, supra note 14, app. C at 765.  Despite no change in Glossary 
definition from DSM-III-R, DSM-IV deleted the example of a bizarre delusion used in the 
DSM-III-R Glossary.  Id.; see discussion supra notes 353–54. 
 356. DSM-IV, supra note 14, at xx.  See generally DSM-IV SOURCEBOOK  (Thomas 
A. Widiger et al. eds., 1994). 
 357. Nancy Andreasen, Schizophrenia and Other Psychotic Disorders, in 1 DSM-
IV SOURCEBOOK 343, 345 (Thomas A. Widiger et al. eds., 1994). 
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bizarre delusion exists or not.358 
The decision to accord additional diagnostic weight to bizarre delusions 
was controversial; the decision to alter the definition of “bizarre” was 
not.  Nevertheless, the definition change appears to have created more, 
not less, confusion among clinicians.  To some, the change was very 
significant; to others, the change was hardly noticeable.359  A study of 
forty-five clinicians and researchers revealed poor interrater reliability in 
distinguishing bizarre from nonbizarre delusions.360  Although the 
respondents were easily able to identify simple delusions of persecution 
or jealousy as nonbizarre, they disagreed significantly about delusions 
with religious, somatic, or grandiose themes.361  But instead of questioning 
whether the definition of “bizarre delusion” was faulty and in need of 
revision, the researchers simply suggested “that the current concept of 
bizarre delusions is not reliable and is therefore given too pivotal a 
position in the current nosology.”362 
In another study involving 214 mental patients, researchers found 
considerable confusion about what constitutes an implausible, and 
therefore, bizarre, delusion.363 Clinicians find it difficult to make 
categorical determinations of the plausibility of the patient’s belief when 
they are confronted with situations involving people of diverse ethnic 
and cultural belief systems or with issues that blur the distinction 
between science fiction and physical fact.364  As examples, they cited “a 
Hispanic patient who reports spirit possession, or a fundamentalist 
 
 358. Dodi Goldman et al., Bizarre Delusions and DSM-III-R Schizophrenia, 149 
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 494, 498 (1992).  Originally, the concept of bizarre delusions relied 
heavily on the writings of Kurt Schneider, who included delusions of being controlled, 
thought broadcasting, thought insertion, and thought withdrawal as first-rank symptoms 
of schizophrenia.  Research, however, indicated that Schneiderian symptoms were not 
pathognomic of schizophrenia, and they were de-emphasized in DSM-III.  When DSM-
III-R was written, the drafters relied more heavily upon the writings of Karl Jaspers, and 
the word “implausible” was substituted for “impossible” to prevent the “blurring” that 
had occurred in the translation from Schneiderian to Jasperian concepts. Andreasen, 
supra note 357 at 345; see also Manfred Spitzer, supra note 325, at 382–84 (discussing 
the disagreement between Schneider and Jaspers).  Kenneth Kendler, M.D., who 
developed a definition of bizarre delusions using Jasperian concepts, suggested that the 
“definition focuses on whether or not it is possible to understand the development of the 
delusion in terms of the emotional experiences of the delusional patient.  Delusions are 
considered bizarre if they involve thought processes that are so divorced from normal 
human experience that the delusions are ‘un-understandable.’”  Robert L. Spitzer et al., 
The Reliability of Three Definitions of Bizarre Delusions, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 880, 
881 (1993) [hereinafter Robert L. Spitzer et al.]. 
 359. Michael Flaum et al., The Reliability of “Bizarre” Delusions, 32 
COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 59, 59 (1991). 
 360. Id. at 62. 
 361. Id. 
 362. Id. 
 363. Goldman et al., supra note 358, at 494, 498. 
 364. Id. at 498–99. 
MORRIS.DOC 2/12/2020  10:35 AM 
[VOL. 38:  973, 2001]  “God Told Me to Kill”  
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1033 
Christian professing to be controlled by Jesus, or an anxious city dweller 
who avoids use of the subway because he is convinced that exposure to 
the electromagnetic field is giving him cancer.”365  These researchers 
also found that “patients with bizarre delusions were not clinically 
distinguishable from [patients] without bizarre delusions.  [In other 
words,] a history of bizarre delusions [was not] prognostic of a more 
severe form of [schizophrenia].”366  These researchers, however, did not 
propose that the definition of “bizarre delusion” be reexamined.  Rather, 
they simply recommended removing the special emphasis given to 
bizarre delusions in diagnosing schizophrenia.367 
Robert Spitzer, M.D., chaired the DSM-III Task Force on Nomenclature 
and Statistics, chaired the Work Group to Revise DSM-III in the 
preparation of DSM-III-R, and also served as Special Adviser to the Task 
Force on DSM-IV.  He and his co-researchers were less pessimistic 
about the interrater reliability of the “totally implausible” standard used 
to measure bizarre delusions in DSM-III-R and DSM-IV.  In their 
research, twelve clinicians (eleven psychiatrists and one social worker) 
rated as bizarre or nonbizarre the delusions presented in 180 vignettes 
using three different definitions of “bizarre.”368  Interrater reliability was 
described as moderate for the “totally implausible” and the “physically 
impossible” definitions and poor for the “un-understandable” definition.369  
Although the reliability of the “totally implausible” definition was 
described as “only fair,” the researchers expressed their belief that it “is 
probably comparable to that of other clinical concepts used in the DSM-
III-R diagnostic criteria for psychotic disorders.”370  Because use of the 
“physically impossible” definition did not substantially improve reliability, 
they concluded that the “totally implausible” definition should not be 
changed in DSM-IV.371 
Ironically, the DSM-IV Sourcebook states that the “totally 
implausible” standard was chosen in DSM-III-R and DSM-IV to invoke 
 
 365. Id. at 498. 
 366. Id. 
 367. Id. at 499. 
 368. Robert L. Spitzer et al., supra note 358, at 881. 
 369. Id.  Under this proposed definition, “[d]elusions are considered bizarre if they 
involve thought processes that are so divorced from normal human experience that the 
delusions are ‘un-understandable.’”  Id. 
 370. Id. at 883. 
 371. Id. 
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the concept of “nonunderstandability,”372 even though Dr. Spitzer and 
his co-researchers confirm the poor interrater reliability of that 
concept.373  Because the interrater reliability of the “totally implausible” 
definition is significantly higher than the “un-understandable” definition, 
apparently the raters invoked some other concept when making their 
assessments. 
The Spitzer study was undoubtedly influential in the discussions about 
revisions to DSM-III-R and in the decision to retain—unchanged—the 
DSM-III-R definition of “bizarre” in DSM-IV.  Nevertheless, the Spitzer 
study has been severely criticized.  Researchers Ramin Mojtabai, M.D., 
and Robert A. Nicholson, Ph.D., note three methodological problems 
that could have artificially elevated reliability.374  First, the individuals 
chosen to rate the vignettes were the authors themselves and their 
associates, and thus were more uniform in experience and training than a 
random sample of practicing psychiatrists.  Second, each rater rated each 
vignette three times, using a different definition each time.  Use of 
different definitions applied to the same facts may have unduly 
highlighted differences in those definitions, and conversely, repeated use 
of the same facts may have made it more difficult for raters to mentally 
shift from one definition to another.  Third, all of the vignettes were 
presented to raters as examples of delusions, and raters were asked to 
evaluate only whether each was a bizarre or nonbizarre delusion.  In 
clinical practice, the psychiatrist must first make an additional judgment: 
Was the patient’s idea delusional or not?375 
Doctors Mojtabai and Nicholson selected a random sample of 30 of 
the 180 case vignettes used by Dr. Spitzer and his colleagues and 
distributed them to a random sample of psychiatrists selected from the 
American Psychiatric Association Membership Directory.376  The results 
were similar to those of pre-Spitzer studies: interrater reliability was 
poor.377  The authors concluded that “[t]he symptom of bizarre delusions 
does not have adequate reliability.”378  They recommended that 
“differential weighting of bizarre delusions in diagnosing schizophrenia 
 
 372. Andreasen, supra note 357, at 345; see supra text accompanying notes 357–58. 
 373. Dr. Spitzer and his colleagues also note: “Unfortunately, no study has 
examined the validity of the concept of bizarre delusions in establishing the boundary 
between schizophrenia and delusional disorder and whether it should have more 
diagnostic importance than other types of delusions in the diagnosis of schizophrenia.”  
Robert L. Spitzer et al., supra note 358, at 883. 
 374. Ramin Mojtabai & Robert A. Nicholson, Interrater Reliability of Ratings of 
Delusions and Bizarre Delusions, 152 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1804, 1804 (1995). 
 375. Id. 
 376. Id. at 1805. 
 377. Interrater reliability was in the .38 to .43 range.  Id. 
 378. Id. at 1806. 
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should be eliminated from future editions of DSM.”379  However, they 
made no recommendation to redefine the term “bizarre delusion.” 
VI.  DIVINING DELUSION: DENYING THE DEIFIC DECREE? 
A.  Religious Beliefs as Delusions: In Theory 
Are religious beliefs bizarre delusions, nonbizarre delusions, or neither?  
The answer appears to be “yes, yes, and yes.”  According to the DSM-IV 
Glossary of Technical Terms, religious beliefs do not qualify as delusions.  
The definition of “delusion” specifically excludes any belief that is “an 
article of religious faith.”380  Identical language appears in DSM-III381 
and DSM-III-R.382  It is not surprising that the American Psychiatric 
Association declined to declare any religious belief to be a false belief.  
After all, our country’s hallowed organizational document precludes the 
establishment of any one religion as the official state religion and 
declares that we, as individuals, are free to exercise any religion of our 
own choosing.  We have become a culturally pluralistic and religiously 
diverse society. 
DSM-IV’s “religious faith” exclusion is part of a larger sentence that 
excludes from the definition of delusion any belief that is “ordinarily 
accepted by other members of the person’s culture or subculture.”383  
Identical language appears in DSM-III384 and DSM-III-R.385  This sentence 
was inserted to sensitize clinicians to cultural differences existing between 
themselves and their patients that must be considered in diagnosing what 
appear to be symptoms of mental disorder, when, in fact, they are not.386  
For example, the explanatory material on schizophrenia cautions: “Ideas 
that may appear to be delusional in one culture (e.g., sorcery and witchcraft) 
may be commonly held in another.  In some cultures, visual or auditory 
hallucinations with a religious content may be a normal part of religious 
experience (e.g., seeing the Virgin Mary or hearing God’s voice).”387  
 
 379. Id. 
 380. DSM-IV, supra note 14, app. C at 765. 
 381. DSM-III, supra note 326, app. B at 356. 
 382. DSM-III-R, supra note 327, app. C at 395. 
 383. DSM-IV, supra note 14, app. C at 765. 
 384. DSM-III, supra note 326, app. B at 356. 
 385. DSM-III-R, supra note 327, app. C at 395. 
 386. See DSM-IV, supra note 14, at xxiv–xxv (discussing ethnic and cultural 
considerations in the preparation of DSM-IV). 
 387. Id. at 281. 
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The introduction to DSM-IV mentions that hearing or seeing a deceased 
relative during bereavement is a religious practice or belief that may be 
misdiagnosed as a manifestation of mental disorder by the “clinician 
who is unfamiliar with the nuances of an individual’s cultural frame of 
reference.”388 
If hearing God’s voice is considered a normal religious experience for 
some people—those of a particular culture—then can this religious 
experience be denied for others who do not share that cultural background?  
If seeing or hearing a deceased relative during bereavement is a religious 
practice or belief for some people, can others who hear the voice of a 
living God at any time be declared delusional for their religious practice 
or belief?  We think not.  Although individuals cannot choose their 
cultural backgrounds, in our society, they can choose their religious 
beliefs.  If a particular belief cannot be identified as a false belief for 
some individuals, it cannot be so characterized for others who choose to 
have the identical belief. 
The American Psychiatric Association apparently thinks otherwise.  
Although it urges clinicians to weigh a person’s ethnic and cultural 
background in assessing whether strange beliefs or practices that appear 
to be psychopathological are, in fact, normal, it seems unwilling to 
consider those same beliefs and practices as normal if they are held by a 
person of a different background.  The DSM definition of “delusion” 
excludes only those beliefs that are “ordinarily accepted by other 
members of the person’s culture or subculture.”389  No allowance is 
made for the individual who alters his or her religious beliefs, either 
after long and careful reflection or suddenly upon a religious revelation.  
No allowance is made for the individual whose new religious beliefs do 
not conform to the recognized religions of that person’s culture or whose 
new religious beliefs have not yet matured into a full-fledged, and 
perhaps, even officially recognized, religion.390  No allowance is made 
for the individual whose new religious beliefs cannot be stated with 
clarity and precision and that are not acceptable, logical, consistent, or 
comprehensible to others.391 
Although religious beliefs do not qualify as delusions in DSM-IV, 
other beliefs that appear to be religious in content but that can be 
 
 388. Id. at xxiv. 
 389. Id. at 765. 
 390. In contrast, the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause protects 
individuals who are not members of any religious sect, church, or organization, but 
whose religious beliefs are sincerely held.  Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 489 
U.S. 829, 834 (1989); see supra text accompanying note 94. 
 391. In contrast, the Supreme Court precluded courts from declaring a person’s 
beliefs nonreligious for these reasons.  Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714–15 
(1981); see supra text accompanying notes 85–93. 
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characterized as false beliefs do.  In other words, the DSM distinguishes 
between “authentic” religious beliefs that are characterized as normal 
and “nonauthentic” religious beliefs that may be characterized as abnormal, 
that is, psychopathological.  To the extent that DSM-IV addresses this 
issue at all, it is unilluminating; it confuses rather than clarifies.  DSM-
IV provides no criteria to aid clinicians in differentiating religious beliefs 
from delusions.  Even in the context of the DSM’s admonition to 
consider cultural context, that source provides no insight to clinicians on 
who determines whether the belief is culturally congruent, or the criteria 
to be used in making the decision, or what aspects or dimensions of the 
belief are important in the assessment.392 
In describing grandiose delusions, a common subcategory of delusions, 
DSM-IV’s Glossary merely states that they include beliefs of a “special 
relationship to a deity or famous person.”393  In discussing delusional 
disorder, DSM-IV states: “Grandiose delusions may have a religious 
content (e.g., the person believes that he or she has a special message 
from a deity).”394  If a man believes that all people, including himself, 
are children of God, his belief would not be characterized as delusional.  
If he believes he is Christ, his belief would be characterized as a 
grandiose delusion—even though under either belief, he would be a son 
of God. 
Because bizarre delusions are specifically identified in the diagnostic 
criteria for delusional disorder, and because the essential feature of 
delusional disorder is the presence of a nonbizarre delusion,395 one would 
assume that delusions with religious content would be characterized as 
nonbizarre delusions.  That obvious answer is not so certain.  Dr. Robert 
Spitzer, a true architect of DSM-III and its subsequent revisions, 
observed that “it is not at all clear how the [DSM] criteria for bizarre 
delusions should be applied to common delusions with religious themes, 
such as communicating with God.”396  DSM-IV itself provides no guidance.  
It merely notes: “Although the determination of whether delusions are 
bizarre is considered to be especially important in distinguishing 
 
 392. Susan Sanderson et al., Authentic Religious Experience or Insanity?, 55 J. 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 607, 608–09 (1999). 
 393. DSM-IV, supra note 14, app. C at 765. 
 394. Id. at 297. 
 395. Id. at 296. 
 396. Robert L. Spitzer et al., supra note 358, at 880.  Although Dr. Spitzer was 
addressing the DSM-III-R criteria for bizarre delusions, the “totally implausible” 
standard of DSM-III-R was not altered in DSM-IV. 
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between Delusional Disorder and Schizophrenia, ‘bizarreness’ may be 
difficult to judge, especially across different cultures.”397  Clinicians 
must make these “especially important” diagnostic decisions without the 
American Psychiatric Association’s wise counsel. 
The Introduction to DSM-IV begins by asserting: “Our highest priority 
has been to provide a helpful guide to clinical practice.”398  In defining 
delusions, in distinguishing bizarre from nonbizarre delusions, and in 
assisting clinicians to distinguish between religious beliefs and delusional 
beliefs with religious content, the drafters of DSM-IV failed to meet their 
stated objective. 
B.  Religious Beliefs as Delusions: In Practice 
With the limited direction provided them by DSM-IV, how do practitioners 
actually decide whether a claimed religious belief is authentic or 
delusional?  In a recent study, researchers developed eighteen written 
vignettes designed to assess clinical judgments of religious authenticity 
and psychopathology.  A core vignette was used for each of six dimensions 
of religious experience.399  Three variations of each core vignette were 
written to reflect conventional, less conventional, and unconventional 
practices.  For example, in one core vignette that focused on the dimension 
of what is communicated, individuals heard the voice of God telling 
them to: (1) baptize their newborn child—a conventional religious 
practice, (2) prepare a worship service—a less conventional religious 
practice, or (3) sacrifice their child—an unconventional religious 
practice.400  The vignettes were tested on sixty-seven mental health 
practitioners of varying professional backgrounds, experience, and 
religious affiliation.401 
The results were not surprising.  For every vignette tested, the 
conventional response was rated significantly more religiously authentic 
and significantly less pathological than the less conventional response.  
For every vignette tested, the less conventional response was rated 
significantly more religiously authentic and significantly less pathological 
than the unconventional response.402  According to the researchers: “The 
essential determining factor in the ratings was not the dimensions of 
religious experience, but the degree to which religious experience 
 
 397. DSM-IV, supra note 14, at 296. 
 398. Id. at xv. 
 399. Sanderson et al., supra note 392, at 609.  The six dimensions were: who the 
experience affects, relationship to God, what is communicated, medium of communication, 
identity of the presence, and literal interpretation for self-punishment.  Id. at 609–10. 
 400. Id. at 609. 
 401. Id. 
 402. Id. at 610, 612. 
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deviated from conventional religious beliefs and practices.  The more 
unconventional the experience, the less religiously authentic and less 
mentally healthy it was deemed to be.”403  The experience that was rated 
as least religiously authentic and most pathological of all vignettes was 
complying with God’s request to sacrifice a child.404  Ironically, this 
experience, at least when performed by Abraham, is often considered the 
most religiously authentic by Jews, Christians, and Muslims;405 it is the 
supreme test of religious faith. 
Clinicians seem to be applying a “Good God” theory to measure the 
authenticity of a religious belief.  If the clinician likes God’s message—
God tells you to baptize your newborn child—the belief qualifies as 
religious; if the clinician does not like the message—God tells you to 
sacrifice your child—it does not.  And yet, when a person confronts a 
sudden tragedy—the person’s child is killed in an auto accident or a 
doctor discloses that the person has cancer—a typical response is to say: 
“It was God’s will.”  Authentic religious belief cannot be circumscribed 
by the “Good God” theory. 
Based on their research, the authors asserted that some historic 
religious practices, and some subcultural practices such as voodoo, 
would be considered pathological today.406  At one time, in Salem, 
Massachusetts, witches were hunted, and when found, were hanged.407  
Today, we no longer conduct heresy trials.408  Rather, those with “false” 
beliefs are subjected to trial by diagnosis—psychiatrists diagnose heresy 
as mental disorder.  For those found to be delusional, medication is 
prescribed to cure them of their unholy thoughts.  The litmus test for 
measuring religious delusion may no longer be the falsity of the belief, 
but rather, its lack of conformity to prevailing cultural norms. 
The authors saw this development, however, not as a denial of DSM-
IV principles but as an affirmation of them.  By using “conventionality” 
as the basis for determining authenticity of religious belief and 
 
 403. Id. at 614. 
 404. Id. 
 405. See generally KARL-JOSEF KUSCHEL, ABRAHAM (1995) (discussing Abraham as 
the common point of reference in the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim religions). 
 406. Sanderson et al., supra note 392, at 614–15. 
 407. See generally CHADWICK HANSEN, WITCHCRAFT AT SALEM (1969); MARION L. 
STARKEY, THE DEVIL IN MASSACHUSETTS (1949). 
 408. In United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944), the Supreme Court noted 
that the Constitution does not permit heresy trials designed to determine the truth or 
falsity of an individual’s religious beliefs.  See supra text accompanying notes 118–20. 
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“unconventionality” as the basis for determining psychopathology, 
participants were doing what DSM-IV prescribes, that is, using cultural 
norms as the basis for their decisions.409  We do not concur in their 
assessment.  DSM-IV’s discussion of ethnic and cultural considerations 
was clearly intended to expand the scope of “normal” thought beyond 
the ideas of the dominant culture, not to contract it to conforming views 
of the orthodox.  DSM-IV alerts clinicians to the possibility that beliefs 
and practices that appear to be symptomatic of mental disorder may be 
normal to individuals from cultural backgrounds that differ from the 
evaluating clinician.410 
C.  Redefining Delusion 
1.  Dr. Manfred Spitzer’s Proposal 
In critiquing the DSM definition of delusion, Dr. Manfred Spitzer was 
most troubled by the requirement of falsity, especially as that requirement 
applies to religious beliefs.411  Because religious beliefs cannot be 
characterized as true or false, an attempt to distinguish true from false 
religious beliefs is, in Dr. Spitzer’s judgment, “misguided and unfruitful.”412  
But he was unwilling to either include or exclude all religious beliefs as 
delusions, characterizing such solutions as “quick and cheap.”413  He 
noted that clinicians throughout the world refer to religious delusions, 
“and it is unwise and unscientific to sacrifice a well-established clinical 
distinction for the sake of a definition.”414 
To address the problem, Dr. Spitzer proposed that the definition of 
delusion be revised to eliminate the requirement of a false belief.  Under 
his definition, “delusion” would be defined “as statements about external 
reality which are uttered like statements about a mental state, i.e., with 
subjective certainty and incorrigible by others.”415  When a person makes a 
statement about his or her mental state, for example, “I am angry,” or “I 
feel sad,” that statement about the person’s inner self can be expressed 
with subjective certainty and incorrigibility, that is, not subject to 
correction by reason and argument.  For statements about the inner self, 
the strongest evidence of the person’s mind is the person’s own thought, 
 
 409. Sanderson et al., supra note 392, at 614. 
 410. See supra discussion accompanying notes 383–88. 
 411. Manfred Spitzer., supra note 325, at 378–79; see supra text accompanying 
notes 335–37. 
 412. Manfred Spitzer, supra note 325, at 379. 
 413. Id. 
 414. Id.  In response, we ask whether it is scientific to continue a clinical distinction 
that cannot be defined. 
 415. Id. at 391 (emphasis omitted). 
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sensation, or feeling.  Delusions, however, are about external reality.  A 
person cannot be subjectively certain and incorrigible about the things, 
events, and persons that make up the external world.  Therefore someone 
who maintains that subjective certainty and incorrigibility about the 
external world is delusional.416 
Dr. Spitzer admitted that his proposed definition would not solve the 
problem of distinguishing religious beliefs from religious delusions.  
However, he expressed the view that his proposal would clarify the 
issue.  If a person claims to have a religious experience, that experience, 
by Dr. Spitzer’s definition, is not a delusion.  If, however, the person claims 
that the experience has “intersubjective validity,” that is, the person 
claims validity without an appropriate willingness to discuss or justify 
the claim, then that experience may be characterized as a delusion.  It is 
not the falsity of the person’s belief that makes it a delusion, but rather, 
the lack of any justificatory reasons that he or she gives for the belief 
and an unwillingness to question or reason about anything pertaining to 
the belief.417 
We question whether Dr. Sptizer’s proposal adequately distinguishes 
authentic religious belief from religious delusion.  If a person claims that 
God spoke to him or her and directed that he or she kill another, how 
should that experience be interpreted?  In one sense, it is a statement 
about external reality—an event that occurred outside the person.  But in 
another sense, the statement is one that refers to the person’s mental 
state.  In essence, the person is expressing the thought: “I feel religiously 
inspired.”  And even if this hurdle can be overcome, how does the clinician 
assess whether the person is claiming that the belief has “intersubjective 
validity”?  What evidence can the person give to satisfy the clinician that 
he or she is appropriately willing to discuss the experience or to justify 
that it really occurred?  What evidence can the clinician give that the 
experience did not occur?  There is little more that the person can do 
than to assert a belief that it did occur; and there is little more that the 
clinician can do than to decide whether the claimed experience occurred 
or not, that is, to decide whether the clinician believes that the person’s 
belief is true or false. 
For purposes of this Article, it is unnecessary to evaluate in greater 
detail the merits of Dr. Spitzer’s proposal.  It is sufficient to note that the 
 
 416. See generally id. at 390–92. 
 417. Manfred Spitzer, supra note 325, at 392. 
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American Psychiatric Association implicitly rejected the proposal when 
it promulgated DSM-IV a few years after Dr. Spitzer’s article was 
published.  Although the Glossary definition of “delusion” requires that 
the belief be about “external reality” and be expressed with subjective 
certainty and incorrigibility, that is, “firmly sustained despite what almost 
everyone else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and 
obvious proof or evidence to the contrary,” the definition retains the 
criterion that the belief be “[a] false belief.”418  Dr. Spitzer’s proposal to 
eliminate this core requirement was far too radical for the American 
Psychiatric Association. 
2.  Our Proposal 
We offer a far more modest proposal, one that retains the false belief 
requirement in the definition of “delusion” but modifies it to require 
greater certainty when a person’s belief is being assessed for certain, 
nonclinical purposes.  We propose the following definition: For 
diagnoses made for forensic purposes only, a delusion is a false belief 
based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly 
sustained despite either violating the laws of the natural and physical 
world, or despite incontrovertible proof to the contrary known 
personally by the examiner.  The incontrovertible proof requirement 
shall not be satisfied by mere statistical evidence that the truth of the 
belief is extremely unlikely.  A sincerely held personal religious belief, 
as defined broadly in United States Supreme Court decisions, shall not 
constitute a delusion. 
a.  Distinguishing Clinical from Forensic Evaluations 
According to the American Psychiatric Association, “DSM-IV is a 
classification of mental disorders that was developed for use in clinical, 
educational, and research settings.”419  The American Psychiatric 
Association expressed its strong concern about the use of DSM-IV in 
forensic settings, where diagnostic information useful for clinical 
purposes could be misused or misunderstood when applied to legal 
standards.420  For clinical purposes, that is, to diagnose a patient’s illness 
in order to prescribe appropriate treatment, mental disorder 
is conceptualized as a clinically significant behavioral or psychological 
syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual and that is associated with 
present distress (e.g., a painful symptom) or disability (i.e., impairment in one 
 
 418. DSM-IV, supra note 14, app. C at 765. 
 419. Id. at xxiii. 
 420. Id. 
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or more important areas of functioning) or with a significantly increased risk of 
suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom.421 
For example, if a man goes to a clinician in great distress because he 
believes that he is being followed or subjected to ridicule—examples of 
persecutory delusions given in DSM-IV422—or that a stranger has 
removed his or her internal organs and has replaced them with someone 
else’s organs without leaving any wounds or scars—an example of a 
bizarre delusion given in DSM-IV423—the clinician appropriately focuses 
on therapy to relieve that distress, not on a careful analysis of whether 
the patient’s belief is a false belief.  The clinician does not test or 
challenge the patient’s self-reported belief, but rather, accepts it at face 
value as the source of the distress.  The purpose of diagnosis in clinical 
practice is to discover the source of the patient’s distress or disability so 
that it can be treated and eliminated. 
In a forensic setting, however, when the psychiatrist is called upon to 
testify in court about the person’s mental condition, the psychiatrist 
serves as an expert witness, not as a treating physician.  In this context, 
when the person faces a loss of liberty through state-imposed involuntary 
civil commitment, or punishment for criminal behavior, or incarceration 
as an insanity acquittee in lieu of criminal punishment, the law 
appropriately demands that the testifying psychiatrist focus his or her 
evaluation on the specific criteria that are at issue and limit his or her 
testimony to the areas of his or her expertise.  If the psychiatrist testifies 
that the person had a delusion and if the definition of “delusion” requires a 
false belief, the court wants to know how the psychiatrist made the 
judgment that the person’s belief was indeed false—what evidence did 
he or she rely upon to make an informed, professional, and scientific 
judgment.  For this reason, in a forensic context, the psychiatrist must 
engage in a more careful and rigorous analysis of the diagnostic criteria 
than is required for clinical practice. 
b.  The Proof of Falsity Requirement 
To diagnose delusion for forensic purposes, the examiner, under our 
proposal, has the obligation of establishing that the examinee’s belief 
 
 421. Id. at xxi. 
 422. As examples of common persecutory delusions, DSM-IV lists a person’s belief 
that “he or she is being tormented, followed, tricked, spied on, or subjected to ridicule.”  
Id. at 275. 
 423. Id. 
MORRIS.DOC 2/12/2020  10:35 AM 
 
1044 
was false.  Although DSM-IV seemingly imposes a similar obligation on 
the clinician making a diagnosis for treatment purposes, it does not 
explain “what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence”424 
that the examinee’s belief is false.  For forensic purposes, the mere 
statistical improbability that the belief is true should not satisfy the 
requirement of “incontrovertible proof” of the falsity of the belief.425  If 
a man claims that the CIA is spying on him, or that his wife is unfaithful, 
the examiner’s “hunch” that the belief is false does not substitute for 
actual proof that what the examinee perceives as truth is simply not so.  
Obviously, psychiatrists performing forensic examinations are not 
detectives conducting private investigations of the examinee’s 
statements to determine the truth or falsity of the expressed belief.  
Psychiatrists lack both the expertise to do so on their own and the 
resources to hire investigators to assist them.  But if “a false belief” is to 
be retained as the essential prerequisite to a delusion, and if 
“incontrovertible proof to the contrary” is required to establish that the 
belief is false, as it is under both DSM-IV and under our proposal, then 
the requirement must be taken seriously. 
For some beliefs, an investigation of their truth may not be necessary.  
If the belief “violates the laws of the natural and physical world,” then 
the examiner may rightly conclude that it is a false belief without 
obtaining further proof.  The language we chose for this requirement was 
taken from Dr. Robert Spitzer and Dr. Michael First, who used that term 
to operationalize and test the concept of “totally implausible” in the DSM 
definition of “bizarre delusion.”426  Nevertheless, the “totally implausible” 
language does not clearly convey that meaning.  To some examiners, 
“totally implausible” means “not understandable.”  The DSM-IV 
Sourcebook tells us that this is the intended meaning of the term.427  To 
others it means “patently absurd and having no possible basis in fact.”428  
That was the language used in DSM-III.  Dr. Spitzer’s research revealed 
that interrater reliability was nearly identical when vignettes were tested 
using DSM-III’s “impossible” definition and DSM-III-R’s “implausibility” 
standard, but that interrater reliability was significantly lower for the 
 
 424. DSM-IV, supra note 14, app. C at 765. 
 425. See generally Grant H. Morris, Defining Dangerousness: Risking a Dangerous 
Definition, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 61, 85–92 (1999) (asserting that actuarial 
assessments of enhanced risk of violence, i.e., use of statistical data on the enhanced 
danger posed by members of a group, should not justify involuntary civil commitment of 
individuals within that group). 
 426. Robert L. Spitzer et al., supra note 358, at 881.  Dr. Spitzer and Dr. First do 
not clarify how they distinguish between the “natural” world and the “physical” world. 
 427. Andreasen, supra note 357, at 345; see supra text accompanying notes 357–58. 
 428. DSM-III, supra note 326, app. B at 356. 
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same vignettes using the “un-understandable” definition.429  As reported 
above, the change in language from DSM-III to DSM-III-R was very 
significant to some clinicians; to others, it was not.430  Some examiners 
may ascribe different meanings, such as “not believable,” “not acceptable,” 
or even “not reasonable,” concepts found in ordinary dictionary definitions of 
“implausible.”431 
We believe that Dr. Spitzer’s operational definition is far preferable.  
It is a standard that is more understandable to examiners.  Thus, it better 
assures that examiners apply the same standard to measure the falsity of 
the examinee’s belief.  Additionally, it directs examiners to test the 
examinee’s belief by the laws of physics and chemistry—sciences that 
are within the examiners’ specialized knowledge and expertise. 
c.  The Definition of Religion and the Exclusion of                                
Religion as a Delusion 
When beliefs are analyzed for forensic purposes, our society needs to 
protect religious beliefs that might be characterized by some examiners 
as delusional beliefs with religious content or religious ideation.  
Although the Supreme Court has carefully avoided defining religion,432 
it has interpreted religion broadly in cases distinguishing religions from 
nonreligions, such as United States v. Seeger433 and Welsh v. United 
States,434 and confirmed the personal nature of religious beliefs in 
Thomas v. Review Board.435  Those insights into the modern meaning of 
religion and religious belief need to be understood and applied by those 
who are asked to distinguish those concepts from delusions.  In assessing 
the beliefs of others, psychiatrists should not be allowed to simply 
substitute their own ideas about what is “reasonable” or “acceptable” as 
a religious belief. 
Guidance is needed because psychiatrists and other mental health 
professionals are far less religious than the general populace.  Over 
ninety percent of Americans profess a belief in God; less than half of 
 
 429. Robert L. Spitzer et al., supra note 358, at 881. 
 430. Flaum et al., supra note 359, at 59; see also supra text accompanying note 359. 
 431. See, e.g., WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1134, 1736 
(Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1986) (defining “implausible” as “not plausible” and 
“plausible” as “worthy of belief: CREDIBLE”). 
 432. See supra text accompanying notes 35–37. 
 433. 380 U.S. 163 (1965); see supra text accompanying notes 51–60. 
 434. 398 U.S. 333 (1970); see supra text accompanying notes 61–71. 
 435. 450 U.S. 707 (1981); see supra text accompanying notes 85–94. 
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mental health professionals profess a similar belief.436  Additionally, 
although mental health professionals are trained to recognize pathology, 
most receive little or no training on religious and spiritual issues.437  
Americans should not anoint these individuals to serve as high priests 
with authority to determine what qualifies as a religious belief. 
Some might assert that it is not necessary to define a religious belief or 
to exclude it from the definition of delusion.  Our proposed “proof of 
falsity” requirement, they would contend, assures that religious beliefs 
are excluded from the definition of delusion.  Consider the following 
three pregnant examples: (1) A man believes he is pregnant; (2) a woman 
believes she is pregnant, despite conclusive laboratory tests that establish 
that she is not; (3) a woman, whose name just happens to be Mary, is 
pregnant and believes that her pregnancy resulted from an immaculate 
conception with God and that her unborn child is the son of God.  Assume 
that all three individuals hold the belief with the requisite subjective 
certainty and incorrigibility.  How are these situations analyzed under 
our proposed definition?  In the first example, the man’s belief violates 
the laws of the natural and physical world, and no further investigation is 
necessary to establish that the belief is a delusion.  In the second 
example, the belief alone (that a woman is pregnant) does not violate 
natural law, and additional testing is required, and must be conducted, to 
prove incontrovertibly that she is not pregnant and is delusional.  In the 
third example, incontrovertible proof that the belief is false does not 
exist, and Mary cannot be found to be delusional.  We may doubt her 
belief, and the likelihood that it is true may be exceedingly small—
although many people believe that it did occur once—but we are unable 
to sustain our burden of establishing that her belief is false.  Under our 
definition, we need not label her belief a religious belief in order to 
reject the delusional label. 
Similarly, if Mary’s son declares that he is the Jesus Christ, or the 
Napoleon (a popular claim in the early nineteenth century), or the Elvis 
(a popular claim in the mid-twentieth century), his belief can be 
 
 436. David B. Larson et al., Systematic Analysis of Research on Religious Variables 
in Four Major Psychiatric Journals, 1978–1982, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 329, 329–33 
(1986) (citing national surveys of the general public reporting that 90 to 96% of those 
polled professed a belief in God and a survey of American Psychiatric Association 
membership reporting that only 43% of psychiatrists professed a belief in God); see also 
supra text accompanying note 25 (discussing a recent Newsweek poll reporting that 84% 
of adult Americans believe God performs miracles). 
 437. See Edward P. Shafranske & H. Newton Malony, Clinical Psychologists’ 
Religious and Spiritual Orientations and Their Practice of Psychotherapy, 27 
PSYCHOTHERAPY 72, 72, 78 (1990) (indicating that in a study of 1000 clinical 
psychologists, 85% of those responding reported that instruction on religious and 
spiritual issues was rarely or never presented in their training). 
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characterized as a delusion, for it violates the laws of the natural and 
physical world.  An individual named Jesus, or Napoleon, or Elvis, 
already existed, and the person now claiming to be that individual is not 
him.  But if Mary’s son claims to be the Messiah, incontrovertible proof 
that his belief is false does not exist, and Mary’s son cannot be found to 
be delusional.  Again, we may doubt his belief, and the likelihood that it 
is true may be statistically minute—although many people believe that it 
did occur once—but we are unable to sustain our burden of establishing 
that his belief is false.  Under our definition, we need not label his belief 
a religious belief in order to reject the delusional label. 
Nevertheless, we propose a specific declaration that a religious belief 
does not qualify for delusional status.  We make this recommendation 
because some religious beliefs do violate the laws of the natural and 
physical world, but would not be declared delusional in our society.  
Consider, for example, the Eucharist in Catholic theology.438  The 
transubstantiation of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ is 
a central rite of worship, one that “makes Mass the divine event.”439  
And yet, if the wine used in that ceremony was subjected to a laboratory 
test after the Mass ended, by the laws of physics and chemistry, it would 
still be wine, not blood.  And the bread would remain bread, not a body.  
The specific exclusion of religious beliefs from the definition of 
delusion assures that they are not mischaracterized as delusions simply 
because they fail some all-too-worldly scientific test. 
d.  Rejecting or Reformulating the Deific Decree Defense 
But what of those who wish to plead insanity as a defense by claiming 
that they killed in response to a deific decree?  If the person’s belief at 
the time he or she acted is declared to be a religious belief and not a 
delusional belief, then an insanity defense should not succeed.  But the 
defendant’s loss may be more theoretical than actual.  As previously 
discussed, the deific decree doctrine is rarely claimed, and when claimed, 
is rarely successful.440  Brandon Wilson, for example, was convicted of first 
degree murder and sentenced to death despite overwhelming psychiatric 
testimony that his claimed religious belief was a delusion.441 
 
 438. See Matthew 26:26–28; Mark 14:22–24; Luke 22:19–20; I Corinthians 11:23–25. 
 439. GARRY WILLS, PAPAL SIN 139 (2000).  Wills critically discusses how the Eucharist 
developed to enhance the power of priests.  See id. at 138–43. 
 440. See supra text accompanying notes 234–35. 
 441. See supra text accompanying note 11. 
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If insanity is no longer available to those who would assert the deific 
decree as a defense, are there other defenses that are available or could 
become available with some modification?  Necessity, for example, is a 
defense when physical forces beyond the defendant’s control render the 
defendant’s illegal conduct the lesser of two evils.442  But the taking of 
an innocent human life does not qualify as the lesser of two evils.  It 
does not qualify even if the defendant believes he or she faces a penalty 
worse than mere death from disobeying God’s command.  Additionally, 
while fire, flood, and other natural disasters qualify as “physical” forces 
beyond the defendant’s control, God as God and not merely as the 
source of those disasters, may not. 
Duress, sometimes referred to as coercion or compulsion, is another 
defense to be considered.  But typically, that defense requires that the 
defendant commit the crime under a threat from another person that the 
defendant will be harmed if he or she does not commit the crime.443  Again, 
God as the threatening agent does not seem to qualify.  Additionally, the 
duress defense requires that the defendant’s fear of the threat have an 
objective, reasonable basis, rather than a subjective one.444  The defendant’s 
religious-based fear is subjective, not objective. 
In a recent article, however, Christopher Slobogin proposes that 
mental disorder should be recast as a factor relevant to general defenses, 
such as mens rea, self-defense, and duress, rather than treated as a 
predicate for the special defense of insanity.445  If, as Professor Slobogin 
proposes, a modern criminal justice system adopts a subjective approach 
to culpability, then defenses available to mentally disordered defendants 
would not have to be differentiated from defenses available to all other 
defendants.446  Duress would be available as a defense to a defendant who 
killed at God’s command “[i]f the perceived consequences of disobeying 
the deity were lethal or similarly significant.”447  And this would be true, 
whether the defendant was considered delusional, as the defendant now 
claims under existing law, or religiously inspired, as would occur under 
our proposal.  The only question is whether society is willing to adopt a 
subjective approach to culpability.448 
 
 442. 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 158 (1998). 
 443. Id. § 160. 
 444. Id. 
 445. Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental 
Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1200 (2000). 
 446. Id. at 1207. 
 447. Id. at 1204–05. 
 448. In his article, Slobogin assumes that society would adopt a subjective approach 
to culpability but cautions: “[T]his is admittedly a big assumption.”  Id. at 1207. 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
In his essay, The Future of an Illusion, Sigmund Freud asserted that so 
long as “the great mass of the uneducated and oppressed, who have 
every reason for being enemies of civilization . . . do not discover that 
people no longer believe in God, all is well.”449  But if they make that 
discovery, the very survival of civilization is jeopardized.  As Freud 
explained: 
If the sole reason why you must not kill your neighbour is because God has 
forbidden it and will severely punish you for it in this or the next life—then, 
when you learn that there is no God and that you need not fear His punishment, 
you will certainly kill your neighbour without hesitation, and you can only be 
prevented from doing so by mundane force.  Thus either these dangerous 
masses must be held down most severely and kept most carefully away from 
any chance of intellectual awakening, or else the relationship between 
civilization and religion must undergo a fundamental revision.450 
We need not agree with Freud’s assessment.  After all, our Pledge of 
Allegiance asserts that we are still “one nation, under God,” and our 
President still completes his oath of office with the vow, “so help me 
God.”451  The birth of Christ, not the birth of Freud or any other scientist, 
is still a national holiday.452  But if Freud can ask the descendants of 
Abraham to reconsider the concept of God, we as a society can ask the 
descendants of Freud to reconsider the concept of delusion, at least as 
we use that concept to assess a person’s religious beliefs.  Perhaps we 






 449. FREUD, supra note 7, at 39. 
 450. Id. 
 451. These examples suggest that the United States, at least as viewed by a majority 
of Americans, is a theistic society. 
 452. This example suggests that the United States, at least as viewed by a majority 
of Americans, is a Christian society.  In a recent survey conducted by the Pew Research 
Center, 75% of the 2041 Americans polled supported President Bush’s so-called “faith-
based initiative”—a proposal to give government money to religious groups to assist 
them in performing social services.  Sumana Chatterjee, Poll: Federal Funds to 
Religious Groups Supported, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 11, 2001, at A-2.  However, 
only 38% supported the eligibility of Muslim and Buddhist groups, 29% supported the 
eligibility of the Nation of Islam, and 26% supported the eligibility of the Church of 
Scientology.  Id.; Laura Meckler, Debate Persists over Plan to Give Money to Religious 
Organizations, TRIBUNE (San Luis Obispo County, Cal.), May 7, 2001, at A-4. 
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